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The Sentence of HIV
Carrie Giffin Basas'
INTRODUCTION: THE VILLAIN AND THE VICTIM
W hose life "counts"? When should the taking of the life of another
person result in the extinguishing of the defendant's life? These are
questions that courts confront regularly. Sentencing decisions are far from
neutral, but rather reflect societal values and biases as well as life-value
judgments about individuals. These life-value judgments cannot help but
reflect a society that has also done a similar calculus about the sick/the
healthy and the productive/the burdensome. In this article, I am interested
in how stigmatized lives-those of HIV-positive murder defendants and
victims-are evaluated in the context of the crimes committed, and how
HIV itself can render a life more empathetic or alienating to a judge or jury.
Do the sanctions rendered in these cases comport with traditional theories
of punishment, such as utilitarianism, retribution, and rehabilitation, or do
they reflect more about the status of HIV in society and stereotypes about
the disease?
A) In a trial for a home invasion that ended in the murder of
one of the occupants, an HIV-positive defendant is confronted
by a witness claiming that the defendant had "tested positive
for HIV" and had said "he had nothing to lose; all he had to live
was two years anyway, so there was not a damned thing you all
could do to him."' The court upholds the introduction of this
statement as "character evidence" countering the defendant's
claims that intoxication may have influenced his crimes and
suggests that his attitude toward his HIV status demonstrated
his "lack of respect for the justice system and his victims, and
the words reveal[ed] a purposeful intent to commit future
crimes."3 The court, on appeal, finds that this statement "was
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2 Tokar v. Bowersox, i E Supp. 2d 986, 1004 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
3 Id. (alteration in original).
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not so prejudicial that it fatally infected petitioner's trial."'4 The
defendant receives a death sentence.'
B) A traveling flea market merchant murders his HIV-positive
business partner while on a business trip.6 The opinion is
unclear about whether the two were lovers or just friends.
During the trial, the prosecution places two bags with the words
"CAUTION, AIDS" within the jury's view of the prosecution's
table.7 The defendant moves for a mistrial.' The judge orders
in limine that the state remove these bags, and yet, they
reappear.9 The judge overrules the motion for a mistrial stating,
"Of course, as I stated to each juror that mentioned AIDS, I
indicated to them that had absolutely nothing to do with this
and they all agreed with that.""' While the court, on appeal,
acknowledged "the specter of AIDS hovered over this case from
the start," it affirmed the ruling of the trial judge that there was
"no manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, no evidence that
the defendant was in any way prejudiced, and thus, no abuse of
discretion."" The defendant, who is not HIV-positive, receives
a life sentence for murdering the HIV-positive victim.'
These two cases have more than their unusual facts in common.
They are also among the thirty-six cases that I located for this article by
searching Westlaw and LexisNexis databases for cases including "HIV13
and murder." 14 These cases became case studies of how disability status
4 Id. at 1005 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at ioLo.
6 State v. Hudson, 1989WL 134703, at "1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
7 Id. at *6.
8 Id.
9 Id.
lo Id.
ii Id. (citations omitted).
12 Id. at* i.
13 I use the term "HIV" throughout this article to encompass HIV and AIDS.
14 Rachal v. Quarterman, 265 Fed. App'x 37 I , 375 (5th Cir. Tex. 2008); Nance v. Norris, 392
F3d 284 (8th Cir. 2004); Turner v. Wong, 641 F. Supp. 2d iOO (E.D. Cal. 2009); United States
v. Wilk, 366 F Supp. 2d 1178 (S.D. Fla. 2oo5), aff'd, 452 E3d 12o8 (iIth Cir. 2006); United
States v. Peoples, 74 F Supp. zd 930 (W.D. Mo. 1999); Tokar v. Bowersox, 1 F Supp. 2d 986
(E.D. Mo. 1998); People v. Mills, 226 P.3d 276 (Cal. 201O); People v. Smith, 68 P.3d 302 (Cal.
2003); People v. McDermott, 51 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2002); People v.Arias, 913 P.zd 980 (Cal. 1996);
People v. Gallon, No. Co39332, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7827 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
2003); People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302 (Colo. App. 1992); State v. Spell, No. IK95-1o-oI9o-RI,
2oo2 Del. Super. LEXIS 46 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2002), aff'd, 803 A.2d 429 (Del. 2002);
Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234 (Fla. 2010); State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2003); Jones
v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2001); Wainwright v. State, 704 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1997); People
v. Nieves, 737 N.E.2d 150 (I11. 2000); People v. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d 1129 (II1. 1998); State v.
Cook, 913 P.2d 97 (Kan. 1996); State v. Divers, 681 So.2d 320 (La. 1996); State v. Lathan, 953
So.2d 890 (La. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Jordan, 728 So.2d 954 (La. Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Young, 569 So.2d 570 (La. Ct. App. 199o); Commonwealth v. Groome, 755 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass.
2001); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 711 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1999); Leonard v. State, 969 P.2d 288
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and punishment intersect. Thirty-four of these cases were in death penalty
jurisdictions;"5 of those, fifteen were cases where death was the penalty.'6
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, the average death
penalty punishment rate for murder cases in the United States is two
percent, with some small fluctuations in states with stronger commitments
to capital punishment.'7 In my set of cases, however, over forty-four
percent of the defendants were sentenced to death in states where it was
an option. While this disparity is startling, I was also working with a small
dataset that could have been affected by selection bias due to the limited
capabilities of Westlaw and LexisNexis case retrieval and the ways in
which cases may be flagged in the court system, or not, as relating to HIV
A larger world of HIV-positive defendants and victims exists beyond this
small set of cases, but that does not make these cases any less important if
they are treated as case studies of potential patterns of stigma and silence. 8
A detailed inquiry into the cases sets the direction for this article, which
analyzes how different lives count in the context of the criminal justice
system, specifically through the lens of HIV/AIDS.
As a historically stigmatized health condition and disability,'9 HIV and
its treatment by judges, juries, prosecutors, and defendants says much
(Nev. 1998); State v. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d 496 (N.C. 2ooo); State v. Lemons, 5o S.E.2d
309 (N.C. 1998); State v. Knight, 459 S.E.2d 481 (N.C. 1995); State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90
(Tenn. 2008); State v. Warren, No. oICo1-97Io-CC-oo455, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
1123 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 1998); State v. Hudson, No. 3, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
773 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 1989); Vinson v. State, No. o6-98-oo127-CR, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 938 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1999); Cruz v. State, 877 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Ct.App. '994);
State v. Macom, No. 34022-1-I, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1455 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1997).
15 Rachal, 265 Fed. App'x 371;Nance, 392 E3d 284; Turner, 641 F Supp. 2d toIo; Wilk, 366 F
Supp. 2d 1178; Peoples, 74 E Supp. 2d 930; Tokar, i E Supp. 2d 986; Mills, 226 P3d 276; Smith,
68 P3d 302; McDermott, 51 P.3d 874; Arias, 913 P.2d 980; Gallon, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
7827; Baca, 852 P.2d 1302; Spell, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 46; Caraballo, 39 So. 3d 1234; Coney,
845 So. 2d izo;Jones, 794 So. ad 579; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d 51 t;Nieves, 737 N.E.2d 150; Cortes,
692 N.E.2d 1129; Cook, 913 P.2d 97; Divers, 68I So. ad 32o; Lathan, 953 So. 2d 89o;Jordan, 728
So. 2d 954; Young, 569 So. 2d 57o; Leonard, 969 P.ad 288; Brewington, 532 S.E.ad 496; Lemons,
501 S.E.2d 309; Knight, 459 S.E.ad 481; Banks, 271 S.W 3 d 90; Warren, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1123; Hudson, I989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 773; Vinson, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 938;
Cruz, 877 S.W.ad 863; Macom, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1455.
16 Rachal, 2oo8 U.S. App. LEXIS at *3; Nance, 392 E3d at 286; Tokar, I F Supp. 2d at 990;
Mills, 226 P3d at 288; Smith, 68 P3d at 312; McDermott, 51 P.3 d at 885; Arias, 913 P.2d at 993;
Jones, 794 So. 2d at 58I; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512; Nieves, 737 N.E.ad at I52; Cortes, 692
N.E.2dat 1132; Leonard, 969 P.2dat 291; Brewington, 532 S.E.2d at 499; Lemons, 501 S.E.ad at
314; Banks, 271 S.W.3 d at io6.
17 1 am currently drawing a random sample of murder cases in these databases to see what
the average rate of death penalty sentencing is.
18 Death Sentencing Rate by State, 1977-1999, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentencing-rate-state-1977-1999 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013)"
19 Sociologist Erving Goffman argues that the visibility of stigma results in the marginalization
of the person bearing it. Stigma alters social dynamics and eventually becomes internalized.
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about underlying theories of punishment in the criminal justice system
and the value of both the lives of HIV-positive defendants and HIV-
positive victims.z" Traditional punishment theorists have not explored
the question of how the health status of HIV may influence sentencing
outcomes and comport with or deviate from the underlying theories
of punishment, consequentialist or non-consequentialist. However,
this question is compelling for pragmatic and theoretical reasons. The
incarcerated population with HIV continues to be 2.5 times that of the
general population in the United States.2 1 While HIV/AIDS-related deaths
in prison have decreased significantly, long-term treatment and health
management issues are significant.22 Further, scholars working at the cusp
of law and cognition recognize the inherent tendencies within the criminal
justice system to punish individuals perceived as "immoral" or "disgusting"
more than others who have committed similar transgressions. 3 People
living with HIV/AIDS could be affected by this phenomenon, as both
victims and perpetrators.
I was drawn to studying how courts respond to HIV in murder cases
after reading over one hundred murder cases involving defendants with
various kinds of health ailments and mental and physical impairments.
While the court system's treatment of these various defendants was as
diverse as the facts of the cases themselves, the HIV-related cases became
memorable in their common threads: the general discomfort of the court
system with discussing the condition, 4 the quiet assumptions made about
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 48-49 (1963).
20 See Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology,
and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766 (2005) (arguing that the death penalty offends
retribution principles of proportionality; "Though capital defendants have usually committed
(or participated in) heinous murders, they very frequently are extremely intellectually
limited, are suffering from some form of mental illness, are in the powerful grip of a drug or
alcohol addiction, are survivors of childhood abuse, or are the victims of some sort of societal
deprivation (be it poverty, racism, poor education, inadequate health care, or some noxious
combination of the above.)").
21 Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Rate of Confirmed AIDS in Prison 2.5 Times the
Rate in the U.S. General Population (Jan. 28, 2oIo), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/press/hivpo8pr.cfm
22 Laura M. Maruschak, HIV in Prisons, 2007-08, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. Bull., Dec. 2009
(revised Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/hivpo8.pdf.
23 See Lasana T Harris, The Influence of Social Group and Context on Punishment
Decisions: Insights from Social Neuroscience (May 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
24 See Scott Burris, Prisons, Law and Public Health: The Case for a Coordinated Response to
Epidemic Disease Behind Bars, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 291,308-09 (1992) (arguing that courts allow
HIV testing out of general fear about HIV, rather than out of necessity); Mary C. Morgan, The
Problems of Testing for HIV in the Criminal Courts, JUDGES J. Spring 199o, at 22, 25 (identifying
the struggle that judges face in determining whether or not HIV tests should be required of
defendants).
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the victims and the defendants, 5 and the procedural missteps that seemed
like more than harmless error.2 6 As I read the stories of HIV-positive
murder defendants, I also began to question the status of HIV-positive
murder victims in the criminal courts.
2 7
As scholars such as Anthony Alfieri and Dan Kahan have explored,
through the process of sentencing, lives are being compared, weighed, and
valued; stigma and social meaning are significant parts of that process."z
Examining criminal life or death sentences through the lens of a health
condition viewed as such provides a critical window into what lives count
as much, more, or less than others.2 9 This kind of inquiry may also expose
resource challenges that people living with HIV/AIDS face. As Scott Burris
has offered, "Even assuming that the legal system can escape the gravity of
the status quo, the lack of resources brought to bear in HIV cases means that
the factual record and legal analysis are very likely to be impoverished.
' 3°
While the cases I found through a keyword search for "HIV and murder"
on Lexis and Westlaw became a small, but relevant, body of thirty-six, their
25 Richard T Andrias, Urban Criminal Justice: Has the Response to the HIVEpidemic Been "Fair"?
2o FORDHAM URB. L.J. 497, 508 (1993) (arguing that the problems of discrimination against
HIV-positive defendants are widespread, both by judges and defense attorneys); Burris,supra
note 24, at 314-19 (describing the courts' role in punishing people who spread HIV and the
resulting stigmatization of those defendants).
26 SeeAndrias, supra note 25, at 499 ("Many of the HIV cases that get the most public attention
are examples of either the legal system's failure to consider accurate scientific information
regarding HIV or the legal system's failure to correctly apply accurate information."); Burris,
supra note 24, at 325 ("Any credible analysis of the legal system must recognize that poor,
stigmatized litigants do not do as well as litigants with wealth or power, and, indeed, the
research on AIDS litigation bears this out.").
27 HIV is arguably a less sympathetic disease than other conditions, which I discuss in Part
IV of this article. See also Andrias, supra note 25, at 501-02 (presenting a case of in which an
HIV-positive defendant was punished severely, while the court ignored the victim's hepatitis
status, which is much easier to transmit).
28 Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STA. L. REv. 8o9, 811
(2000) (examining narratives of race, social norms, and community in criminal prosecutions);
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 (1997)
(drawing on the work of Bentham, Posner, and others to explain the interactions of social
dynamics and punishment).
29 See J. Caleb Rackley, Legal Ethics in Capital Cases: Looking For Virtue in Roberts v. Dretke
andAssessing the Ethical Implications of the Death Row Volunteer, 36 ST. M.AR's L.J. I 119, 1163-64
(2005) (advising attorneys to present "all potentially beneficial evidence from the defendant's
life tending to illustrate his humanity").
30 Burris, supra note 24, at 325.
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patterns and texts revealed something larger about criminal punishment,
devaluation,3 stigma,3" and disability.33
The article will proceed in four parts. Part I provides an introduction
to the general theories of punishment, familiar to both students and
scholars of criminal law, as well as a discussion of why the United States
criminal system avoids the criminalization of status and why HIV itself
may be worthy of mitigating or merciful treatment.34 Part II offers a history
of HIV in the United States and a brief overview of the intersection of
HIV status, the criminal justice system, and HIV stigma trends. In Part
III, I engage the cases themselves through a combination of narrative case
studies and descriptive data and suggest how theories of punishment may
or may not align with the cases themselves. In this section, I am particularly
interested in the interaction between HIV status and victimhood and
vilification. Part IV ties these first three sections together by analyzing how
additional theoretical lenses might be applied to the social and physical
disability that HIV status presents in these cases. This analysis reveals that
traditional theories of punishment are not entirely explanatory in these
particular murder cases.35 In this final section, I propose an overarching
theory that punishment in these cases is based on disability status-both
actual health status and perceived disabilities (e.g., race, gender, and sexual
orientation)-rather than merely the merits themselves. The effect of
31 Shame, arguably, is a central feature of the American system of punishment. Toni M.
Massaro, Shame, Culture, andAmerican CriminalLaw, 89 MICH. L. REV. I88o (1991).
32 NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER, AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 161-
62 (198o) (arguing that "the hardship of stigma is much harder to estimate than the hardship
of a fine or imprisonment").
33 Courts can consider disability in a number of ways, from a "vulnerable victims" aggravating
factor approach for crimes involving victims with disabilities, to defenses and mitigating factors
related to physical and mental impairments. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3A.I.I,
introductory cmt. (2010) (enhancing a sentence when a victim was targeted because of "race,
color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation" and in the
case of a victim "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition"); see, e.g.,
Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J.
461, 508-09 (1996) (discussing the role of evidence of medical concerns and related behavioral
issues in criminal trials, but suggesting that safeguards are needed to prevent the making of
emotional decisions); Mark E. Olive & Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary Guidelinesforthe
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penally Cases to Change the Picture in Post-Conviction,
36 HOFSTRA L. REv. Io67, 1072-73 (2OO8) (providing the importance of comprehensive, multi-
generational mental health evaluations in capital cases).
34 See E. Lauren Arnault, Status, Conduct, and ForcedDisclosure: What Does Bowers v. Hardwick
Really Say? 36 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 757, 772 (2003) (explaining the U.S. courts' approach to
punishing conduct, not mere status).
35 See Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race and Mental Status,
15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 17-18 (2oIo) (discussing how different kinds of disabilities may
interact with systems of the state to produce different levels of stigma and discrimination).
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disability is that it becomes part of the crime itself, combining stigma with
sentencing considerations.
36
I. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT: WHAT, How, AND WHY WE PUNISH
A. The "Why" of Punishment: A Primer
Punishment is the recognition of, and corresponding reaction to,
violation of rules of social order and values. As I will explore further in this
article, the particular rules that a person violates provide justification for
the punishment, in both its form and severity. Criminal punishment serves
both pragmatic and normative functions. There must be a way to contain
and restrict offenders, and in doing so, there is an accompanying moral
judgment.37 Theories of punishment both expose and complement the
functions of the state and reflect social categories, institutional practices,
and empirical and community considerations.38
Perhaps the most interesting thing about state punishment is that,
in exercising its capacity, the state is taking on a role that is otherwise
morally prohibited.39 Scholars of punishment are, therefore, not only
interested in state action and the reasoning for it, but also the philosophical
underpinnings. Scholar Laurence Claus has argued that undergirding
the system of criminal punishment is the value of antidiscrimination, as
reflected in the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
or excessive punishments.1a According to Claus, historically a punishment
had to be administered in a discriminatory fashion to be considered
"unusual."' 41 Punishment, as framed, becomes not only about what is done
to a person who has offended social rules, but also about on what basis
36 For some examples of how disability interacts with the criminal justice system, see
Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental Disability and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 457 (I995) (pointing out that some
defense attorneys might encourage clients to not reveal mental disabilities "for fear of upward
departures, thus diminishing the likelihood that such a defendant will receive any meaningful
treatment once incarcerated"); Ellen C. Wertlieb, Individuals with Disabilities in the Criminal
Justice System: A Review ofthe Literature, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 332,334-47 (I991) (identifying
problems with disability awareness and responsiveness in the criminal justice system, from
the initial stage of police interrogation through incarceration and release).
37 R.A. DUFF & DAVID GARLAND, Introduction to A READER ON PUNISHMENT 1-2 (R.A. Duff and
David Garland eds., 1994).
38 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law
andJustice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (suggesting that intuitions about justice are widely
held and reform efforts must be directed at harnessing those shared senses of right and wrong).
39 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
72-73 (1968).
40 Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARv. J. L. & PUB. Pot'Y 119,
121 (2004).
41 Id. at 123.
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punishment determinations are made and the manner in which they are
rendered.4"
This search for a philosophical justification or purpose for punishment
and accountability for its administration has arisen in the formation of
and responses to various schools of punishment. The description of these
viewpoints presented here is not exhaustive but merely intended to set
the backdrop for understanding HIV's interaction with the criminal justice
system through these murder case studies. As Antony Duff and David
Garland have noted, any critique of punishment practices will have to be
grounded in its own normative arguments, which is precisely my project in
Part IV of this article.43
B. Theories of Punishment: What and How
Normative theories of punishment are generally consequentialist, non-
consequentialist, or a combination of both. The differences between these
approaches inform not only decisions about who is punished, but how
they are punished, both in form and extent. These kinds of considerations
about what and how we as a society punish criminally are relevant to
thinking about how perceptions of HIV might become entwined with the
sentencing process.
1. Consequentialist and Nonconsequentialist.-Consequentialists look forward
and view the appropriateness of any action through the lens of its overall
consequences. If the consequences are as good or better than an available
alternative, then the action is right, and if the consequences are worse than
the alternative, then the action is wrong. 44 What makes something right or
wrong is a more nuanced question because it depends on the good that the
consequentialist has identified. Certain consequentialists view the "greatest
happiness of the greatest number" as the goal to be promoted, while others
view dominion, autonomy, or welfare as the good to be maximized.45 These
approaches are captured by classic utilitarians, such as Bentham, who would
evaluate the appropriateness of the punishment, which might otherwise
be considered evil, against the punishment's capacity to create pleasure or
alleviate pain.' Here, the focus is on the good itself and "minimiz[ing] the
42 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 139-41 (2001) (characterizing American penal policy, in the aftermath
of the rehabilitation agenda, as bifurcated-adopting community partnership strategies, as
well as punitive state control of offenders); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Jusice, 121 HARv. L.
REV. 1969, 1971 (2008) (arguing that the startling racism and other inequalities of the criminal
justice system are due to a loss of local control).
43 R.A. DUFF & DAVID GARLAND, supra note 37, at 2.
44 Id. at 6.
45 Id.
46 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 20
(London, 1789).
[Vol. loi
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net level of suffering," not the troubling actions that led someone to be put
forth for punishment.
47
Utilitarians are also responsible for advancing theories of punishment
based on general and individual deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.48 Under general and individual deterrence approaches,
respectively, punishment can serve to influence other potential lawbreakers
to comply with the state's rules, or the punishment itself can be directed at
the offending person, encouraging him or her to avoid future violations.
49
Incapacitation is the goal of removing the offending individual from
the general population to ensure the safety of others and to curb future
wrongdoing. Rehabilitation, while generally considered a consequentialist
approach, is also a therapeutic approach, bringing together education and
health services for the offending individual as part of a larger effort oriented
toward crime reduction."0 The emerging field of restorative justice builds on
this rehabilitative tradition by involving victims and communities affected
by crime in deciding what will heal the community as a whole and perhaps
also advance the ability of the offender to return to society."1 It shifts the
focus away from the state versus the defendant to collaborations between
the state, the victim, the offender, and the larger community.
52
Non-consequentialists, usually retributivists, cast a backward glance
and view actions as being independently right or wrong, regardless of their
consequences. 3 Punishment is then the process by which the guilty are
made to suffer, and the suffering itself is what the guilty deserve. 4 Negative
retributivists posit that only guilty individuals may be punished, and even
then, only in accordance with the principle of desert.5 5 Therefore, under a
negative retributivist approach, not everyone would be punished because
the level of desert would not call for it. Positive retributivists, however,
47 David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16
LAw & PHIL. 507, 507 (1997).
48 KATHLEEN AUERHAHN, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: EVALUATING
CALIFORNIA'S IMPRISONMENT CRISIS 18 (2003).
49 JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE, at ix, 4 (1975).
50 But see Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law andMorality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523,
1553 (2007) (arguing that there is an intrinsic good in treating offenders, beyond reducing
crime levels).
51 Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 227-30 (2003).
52 See John Braithwaite, Reintegrative Shaming, Republicanism, and Policy, in CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY: PUrING ThIEORY TO WORK 191-94 (Hugh D. Barlow ed., 1995) (suggesting that
shaming and labeling can serve important functions in both punishment and the restoration
of social order and community cohesion).
53 DUFF & GARLAND, supra note 37, at 7.
54 LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 7-8 (Ashgate 2006).
55 See J. L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
677-78 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross, eds., 4th ed. 199I).
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hold that guilty individuals "must always be punished, to the full extent of
their desert." 56
If desert is of importance to understanding retribution, then how is
desert defined?57 That question has proven to be slippery in the study of
punishment. 8 Desert serves as a justification, connecting the crime and
punishment. It has been described as an intuition that the guilty deserve
punishment. 9 Other scholars have not grappled with defining desert, as
much as they have described how it serves a necessary societal function.
60
Perhaps the best definition of desert is "proportionate punishment," with
all of the baggage that the ill-defined parameters of this definition import.
61
These characterizations of punishment are necessarily stripped of their
complexities and points of overlap. They may also fail to take into account
the role of the punisher as an individual. 6 As Leo Zaibert has offered,
the punisher may cause suffering to the wrongdoer simply to offset any
wrongdoing done to them, without taking into consideration principles of
proportionality.
63
2. Expressive Function.-A third approach to punishment is educative,
communicative, or expressive theory.'4 Unlike consequentialist and
retributivist schools of thoughts, these theories fuse punishment with a
specific goal, such as a moral teaching or education. Rather than seeing
the purpose of punishment fulfilled by punishment itself (retributivist) or
linking punishment and purpose in a contingent fashion (consequentialist),
this approach frames punishment as the inherently correct tool for pursuing
the identified goal-even if that goal is never reached.
6
One critique of the expressive school is that this form of orientation
may result in punishment that sends a social message or rehabilitates a
particular offender through education, but it can end up looking like law
without teeth.66 This concern is particularly relevant if the expression's
56 DUFF & GARLAND, supra note 38, at 7.
57 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 91 (1995)
(providing five different accounts of desert).
58 Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U.
L. REV. 843, 889 (2002).
59 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW H68 (1997).
60 See DUFF & GARLAND, supra note 37, at 6-7.
61 Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1221 (zooo) (defining
"proportional punishment" as apportioning punishment in each case with respect to the
person's desert).
62 ZAIBERT, supra note 54, at 28-29.
63 Id. at 38.
64 DUFF & GARLAND, supra note 37, at 8. See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function
of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970)
(describing expressionism as a distinct approach to punishment).
65 DuFF & GARLAND, supra note 38, at 8.
66 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool
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ideal and its real consequences do not align. 67 Further, if the orientation of
the public is toward retributivist or utilitarian goals, expression alone may
undermine societal support of legal institutions. 68 Still, when combined
with other, more familiar forms of punishment, expressionist goals may
serve to strengthen the function of each approach.69
C. The Challenge of HIVas a Consideration in Punishment
This background in punishment theories sets a useful context for the
focus of this paper-HIV's interaction with punishments in murder cases-
but theories of punishment do not directly address the question of why
HIV should even be a consideration in these cases. In making punishment
determinations, courts might treat HIV in three distinct ways: as a neutral
factor, as an aggravating factor, or as a mitigating factor. How these various
treatments could unfold regarding the HIV status of the defendant or
victim is important to examine before undertaking any case analysis.
1. Neutral, Aggravating, and Mitigating.-Neutrality would mean excising
the HIV status and its social implications from the judgment and sentencing
processes. In fact, many of the courts in these cases gloss over HIV or say
something to the effect that it could go either way as a consideration and
that they are better off ignoring it. The focus of punishment then becomes
on the offense itself, not the offender and his or her health status. However,
the challenge is that HIV can always linger in the background of a case.
As this article will discuss, the social stigma of HIV may quietly inform
the punishment even if the court does not name it as a mitigating or
aggravating factor.
Courts could treat HIV as an aggravating factor, as is the case in many
sexual assaults involving the actual or attempted transmission of HIV. 0
Here, HIV poses an additional threat beyond the elements of the offense.
Retribuvists might characterize this threat as being deserving of more
punishment, while utilitarians may want to contain a defendant with HIV
who is willing to use that as a tool of crime.7 Even if HIV is not part of
for CriminalEnforcement?, 8o B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1269 (2000) (suggesting this phenomenon may
result in the context of hate crime legislation).
67 Id. at 1269-70.
68 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453
(1997).
69 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law andEconomics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585,587 (1998).
70 UNAIDS, Criminalization of HIV Transmission: Policy Brief 2 (2oo8), available at http:l
data.unaids.org/pub/basedocument/2oo8/2o8o73 I-jc 15 I3policy-criminalizationen.pdf
(last visited October 29, 2o12); CHLP's Positive Justice Project, Ending and Defending
Against HIV Criminalization: State and Federal Laws and Prosecutions i(Fall 200),available
at http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/view/564 (last visited Jan. i5, zoI3).
71 See Richard Elliott, UNAIDS, Criminal Law, Public Health, and HIV Transmission: A
Policy Options Paper 20-22 (2002), available at http://www.infocenter.nercha.org.sz/sites/
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the crime itself, it may pose additional costs in the prison process, such
as health care and pharmaceutical expenses, that could be lessened if the
HIV-positive defendant's life was shorter." If the victim has HIV, however,
the courts may want to impose additional sentencing to respond to his or
her status as a vulnerable victim.7" Courts here can use sentencing to make
statements about the value of all lives, while protecting ill populations from
being the victims of hate-based or "mercy killings."
Finally, courts could treat HIV as a mitigating factor that makes a
defendant and his crimes more sympathetic in the sentencing process.74 This
approach, in the context of HIV-positive defendants, is very compelling
in a society and court system where HIV stigma can influence judgments
to be reactionary to the disease, as well as to the crime. The mitigating
approach recognizes and adjusts for the potential influence of both social
stigma and the effects of the disease, weighing the fact that defendants
living with HIV may have very difficult lives. HIV can be a debilitating
and stigmatized illness that brings with it its own forms of punishment and
suffering. This is not to imply that HIV is a death sentence, but merely to
recognize the ways in which it shapes the lives of defendants even before
their crimes and during and after incarceration. It comes with its own
social backlash separate from the crimes committed. Scholars interested
in retribution could see HIV as lessening the culpability of the defendant,
while utilitarians might conclude that society's interests are better served
by reducing the severity of the sentence and perhaps offering some
additional treatment services, either in prison or the community.
This kind of approach may also be guided by principles of mercy in
which the humaneness of the punishment is considered in conjunction with
the suffering that the HIV-positive person may be experiencing because of
default/files/CrimilLawPubHealthTrans.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
72 See Chad Kinsella, Corrections Health Care Costs 9-I1, The Council of State Governments
(January 2004), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/csg/Corrections+Health+Care+
Costs+x-2i-o4.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2013) (finding that the healthcare costs of an HIV
inmate are close to $2oo,ooo over a lifetime); Mac Taylor, Providing Constitutional and Cost-
Effective Inmate Medical Care, State of California Legislative Analyst's Office (April 19, 2012),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2o2/crimlinmate-medical-care/inmate-medical-
care-041912.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2013) (finding that doctors' visits outside prison could
cost $zooo each day for each inmate).
73 Criminal sentencing codes at the state and federal levels provide for sentence
enhancements when a defendant knew or should have known that a victim was particularly
vulnerable or incapable of resistance because of impaired capacity or diminished health. HIV-
positive victims would fall within this list, depending on the severity of their illness. They also
could be targets for bias crimes. See Lu-in Wang, Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 8o B.U.
L. Rev. 1399, 1428-29 (2000).
74 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Profession
Towarda Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REv. 63 1, 657-58 (2004) (reiterating that
mitigating factors can be any evidence about character, record, or the offense itself that the
defendant asserts is relevant for showing the appropriateness of a sentence less than death).
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the disease 5. 7 Those guided by mercy considerations are concerned about
the moral implications of punishing people severely when they are already
struggling with significant health concerns. A merciful approach places
the HIV-positive defendant in a compassionate context that takes into
account the hurdles imposed by the disease itself.76 And in considering
the lives of HIV-positive victims, a merciful approach might also extend
to the defendants in those cases, raising some complicated concerns about
who deserves mercy and what that looks like. Should mercy killings, for
example, be recognized and accommodated? Or is mercy simply a principle
that reintroduces humanity into the distancing process of sentencing,
regardless of the victim or the defendant's health status?
If courts, however, were to treat the murder of HIV-positive victims
as a mitigating factor for defendants, they would be suggesting that
those victims' lives count less than others in determining desert, or that
perhaps there is something socially desirable or pragmatic about ending
the lives of people with HIV. One sentiment behind treating the murders
of HIV-positive victims as mitigating the severity of the crime and the
corresponding punishment would be that the lives of HIV-positive victims
are already compromised by the disease.77 While treatment of HIV has
advanced dramatically since its identification, HIV-positive people may
face shortened life-spans and high medical costs while they are living.7"
These costs could be equated to a social drain. This line of argument is
indeed disturbing, but considerations and misjudgments about quality of
life have guided other policy considerations about disability and health
status in the United States' history, such as with the sterilization of people
with disabilities and the eugenics movement. 9 In the same way that it may
seem merciful to allow HIV status as a mitigating factor in sentencing of an
HIV-positive defendant, the mercy argument could extend to ending the
75 See Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 8I
CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996) (calling for the need for a clarification of mercy's role in capital
sentencing).
76 Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 Yale L.J.
389, 389 (1989) (likening mercy to discretion).
77 HIV stigma feeds into this perception of deservedness for the disease, moral judgment,
and social distancing. See e.g., Rachel S. Lee, et al., Internalized Stigma Among People Living with
HIV-AIDS, 6 AIDS & BEHAV. 309, 309-10 (2002) (illuminating the moral judgment aspects of
the disease, as well as the perception of it as a death sentence).
78 While survival rates have improved dramatically since the beginning of the disease's
identification, associated health maintenance costs are very expensive ranging from $ I,ooo
to over $4o,ooo/year at the individual level. K.A. Gebo, et al., Contemporary Costs of HIV
Healthcare in the HAARTEra, 24 AIDS 2705 (2010).
79 See generally A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO THE
HUMAN GENOME ERA (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 201 I) (discussing eugenics as a way to describe
and justify cultural shifts and law in the United States).
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suffering of an HIV-positive victim, even though that may not have been
his or her wish.
2. The Punishment of Status.-What is most interesting about this inquiry
into how courts could view and respond to HIV is how the disease could
be acting as a form of status in the criminal justice system. Related
to approaches to punishment is the underlying question of whether
we, as a society, can punish other undesirable behavior that may not be
criminal unto itself-drinking and promiscuity, as chief examples-or
morally questionable statuses, such as drug addiction. Because of the
consequences of criminal punishment and the modern system's focus on
mens rea for crimes, the Supreme Court, through its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, has held that the punishment of status alone is cruel and
unusual punishment.8 ° The groundbreaking Robinson v. California case in
1962 prompted the examination of how status may be punished, if at all, by
the criminal courts. Robinson involved a jail sentence of ninety days to one
year for a man whose crime was being "addicted to the use of narcotics."81
After Robinson, Powellv. Texas addressed the issue of status in the context of
alcoholism and public drunkenness, reinforcing Robinson's holding."
In the wake of Robinson, legal scholars speculated as to how status might
be handled in the criminal law system. Herbert L. Packer suggested that
if legislatures could no longer "make it a 'crime' to be 'sick'," criminal law
might see its "demise."83 Others suggested, perhaps more pragmatically,
that Robinson would shift responses to addiction from punishing it to
treating it. 84 Almost fifty years after Robinson, the ban on punishment of
mere status remains a central tenet of American criminal law doctrine. An
understanding of why this is the case is enriched by viewing Robinson and
Powell not as mere status cases, but also as implicating doctrines about the
proportionality of punishment.
8
While a discussion of Robinson and Powell may seem unusual in the
context of an article about HIV 'and murder, I contend that given the
8o See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 AMz. L.
REV. 1259, 1282-83 (1997) (drawing a parallel between sexual orientation and Robinson's ban
on the punishment of status). Butsee Edward A. Fallone, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal
to Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 441,459-60 (1988) (suggesting public
health quarantine initiatives for people living with HIV/AIDS who are not responsible about
disease treatment and prevention, but distinguishing that kind of punishment for poor
behavior from Robinson status cases).
8I See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 66o-6i (1962).
8z See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968).
83 Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 147 n. 144.
84 See John B. Neibel, Implications of Robinson v. California, I Hous. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963).
85 See Elizabeth M. M. O'Connor, The Cruel and Unusual Criminalization of Homelessness:
Factoring Individual Accountability into the Proportionality Principle, I 2 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 233,
235-36 (2oo6).
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history of public attitudes and policies toward HIV, 6 the question of the
relationship of status to punishment cannot be ignored. Lives have been
taken in the cases that I will present and some form of punishment was
due, but an issue lingering in the background is whether or not the focus
has in some way shifted to status in determining the proportionality of the
punishment. HIV as a status issue, even in the face of serious crimes, might
raise Robinson and Powell concerns about disproportionate punishment.
Status needs to be considered along with the underlying punishment
theory and the criminal behavior itself. When HIV did not cause the crime
itself or even amplify or aggravate the crime, the relevant question is to
what extent it has been treated as a crime in itself and has served, arguably,
in a non-neutral, stigmatizing capacity in sentencing."s Potential answers to
that question are as complicated as the disease itself, its social treatment,
and the case studies to be discussed in Part III.
II. HIV, DISEASE STIGMA, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Examining the issue of how HIV status becomes enmeshed with
sentencing requires an understanding of what HIV has come to mean
over time, both as a disease and a social phenomenon. The construction
of HIV's meaning is not a passive process. It has become shaped not only
by dominant social actors who are HIV-negative, as most judges and juries
are, but also by advocacy groups responding to the epidemic as a health
concern and locus of stigma.
A. The Historical Context of HIV and HIV Stigma
The punishment of HIV in the criminal justice system is closely tied
to its historical and social context. The legal and social science literature
involving HIV and AIDS in the criminal context revolves around the
criminalized transmission of the disease,88 disease transmission and
health care during incarceration, 9 and more strikingly, in international
law-punishing intentional HIV transmission with the death penalty.9"
86 See discussion infra at Part II.
87 See Harris, supra note 23.
88 See James B. McArthur, As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the
Criminalization of HIVExposure, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 707, 710 (2009); Andre A. Panossian et al.,
Criminalization of Perinatal HIV Transmission, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 223, 224 (1998).
89 Kathleen Knepper, Responsibility of Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the
HIV Virus in Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 45,46-47 (1995).
90 Uganda has attempted to pass a bill that would impose the death penalty on homosexuals
transmitting HIV Philip Webster, Uganda Proposes Death Penalty for HIV Positive Gays,
THE TIMES (Nov. 28, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/africa/
article2594435.ece. The legislature may consider the bill again in 2011. See Reports Suggest that
Uganda's New Parliament Will Consider the Notorious Anti-Homosexuality Bill, DEATH PENALTY
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What these various articles have in common is their approach to HIV as
a disease for containment and possible sanction. HIV becomes the threat
and the criminal justice system responds with either protective or punitive
measures. 1 To understand the system's approach to HIV is to understand
the history of HIV itself and societal responses to it.
When compared to other diseases that have experienced changed social
dynamics and medical responses, such as smallpox, the plague, and polio,9"
HIV has a relatively recent history. Though the first case of HIV was not
reported in the United States until the early 1980s, medical cases indicating
the features of AIDS were reported as many as ten years earlier.93 The
global pandemic probably began in the 1970s.94
NEWS (May 19, 201 i), http://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/2ol I/05/reports-suggest-that-
ugandas-new.html. Under the Penal Code Amendment Act of 2007, Uganda already allows for
the death penalty for child sex offenders with HIV. See Hon. Dora C. Kanabahita Byamukama,
Effectiveness of Legislation Enacted to Address Harmful Practices Against Women in Africa, UNITED
NATIONS, 8 (May I I, 2oo9), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vawlegislation-2009/
Expert%2oPaper%2oEGMGPLHP%2oDora%2oByamukama .pdf. This approach is not
confined to the African continent. In 2011, Rep. Janna Taylor urged the Montana legislature to
keep the death penalty in the state to be able to appropriately punish prisoners with HIV who
might try to kill again while incarcerated by making blow-darts with their saliva; Rep. Janna
Taylor Talks About HIV-Positive Inmates, MISSOULIAN.COM (Feb. 10, 201 I), http://missoulian.
com/youtube_7 I4fcc92-359b- i eo-bafc-oolcc4coo2eo.html.
91 See Michael L. Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS: Denial of Certiorari
in HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 6i ALB. L. REV. 897, 912-13 (1998).
92 See generally Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal
Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, I6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 329 (1989) (discussing
legal ramifications brought on by the threat of epidemics); Edward P. Richards et al., The
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign of 2003: Why Did It Fail and What Are the Lessons for Bioterrorism
Preparedness?, 64 LA. L. REV. 851 (2004) (discussing the necessity of a smallpox vaccination
program due to the uncertainty of outbreak).
93 CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION OF VACCINE-
PREVENTABLE DISEASES 249 (William Adkinson et al. eds., 2012), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/polio.pdf ("Polio reached a peak in the United States
in 1952, with more than 2 ,ooo paralytic cases."); HIVin the United States: An Overview, CENTER
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/
factsheets/usoverview.htm (last modified Mar. 14, 2012) (finding that an estimated 619,400
people died from AIDS since the epidemic began through 2009); Plague, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Feb. 2005), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs267/en/index.html (finding that the
plague, bubonic being one form of it, has a thirty to sixty percent mortality rate); Smallpox,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (zooI), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox/en/index.
html (finding that in 1967, smallpox threatened sixty percent of the world's population,
proving to be deadly in twenty-five percent of cases). Interestingly, a study from several years
ago linked smallpox to a genetic mutation that might make people more resistant to the AIDS
virus. Smallpox in Europe Selected for Genetic Mutation that Confers Resistance to HIV Infection,
SCIENCE DAILY (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2oo3/I1/031120074728.
htm.
94 Jonathan M. Mann, AIDS: A Worldwide Pandemic, in CURRENT TopIcs IN AIDS, 2 (M.S.
Gottlieb et al. eds., 1989).
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The disease became associated with stigmatized communities and
behaviors from its onset. Even when the source of the transmission was
unknown, researchers and the public largely attributed the disease to
homosexual activity, intravenous drug use, 9 and other perceived "deviant"
sexual behavior. In 1981, Dr. Curran of the Center for Disease Control was
quoted in The New York Times as saying, "No cases have been reported
to date outside the homosexual community or in women."' AIDS became
known also as gay compromise syndrome, 97 gay cancer,98 GRID (Gay-
Related Immune Deficiency), AID (Acquired Immune Deficiency), 99 and
acquired immune dysfunction. 1°°
By 1983, when heterosexual monogamous women were reporting cases
of AIDS, anxiety grew about the risk that the disease posed outside of
perceived deviant communities. 10 1 People without HIV or AIDS began to
feel more vulnerable and could no longer view the issue as something that
only happened to others.102 With anxiety came prejudice and civil rights
violations concerns. Even with additional information, the public seemed
to continue to react based on a sentiment that the disease was self-caused
because of moral failings, rather than treating it as a growing public health
issue."0 3 By 1987, researchers and the public had a better grasp on the
illness and the associated transmission risk factors. 1°4
HIV/AIDS is no longer the death sentence that it once posed thanks to
effective antiretroviral medications, but barriers to health care access and
95 Henry Masur et al., An Outbreak of Community-Acquired Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia-
Initial Manifestation of Cellular Immune Dysfunction, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1431, 1436-37(981).
96 Lawrence K. Altman, Rare Cancer Seen in 46 Homosexuals, N.Y. TMES, July 3, i98I, http://
www.nytimes.com/ 198 1/07/03/us/rare-cancer-seen-in-4 i-homosexuals.html.
97 R.O. Brennan & D.T Durack, Gay Compromise Syndrome, 2 LANCET 1338, 1338 (198i).
98 See Lou Chibbaro Jr., 'Gay Cancer' Focus of Hearing, THE WASHINGTON BLADE (Apr. 16, 1982),
http://waxman.house.gov/sites/waxman.house.gov/files/GayCancerFocus-ofHearing.pdf.
99 Lawrence K. Altman, New Homosexual Disorder Worries Health Officials, N.Y. TIMES, May I I,
1982, at Ci.
io Id.
1o See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports
Immunodeficiency Among Female Sexual Partners of Males with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) - New York, 31 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly. Rep. 697, 697-98, (1983), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ooool221.htm.
102 Richard Parker & Peter Aggleton, HIVIAIDS-Related Stigma and Discrimination: A
ConceptualFrameworkandanAgendaforAction, HORIZONS PROCRAM, http:/lhivaidsclearinghouse.
unesco.org/search/resources/horizons.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
103 See Larry 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory
Policy in the United States, 261 JAMA 1621, I62i (1989) (emphasizing that the main groups
tending to have HIV are "disfavored populations," making society less accepting of the
disease and those people living with it).
104 See History of AIDS Up to 1986, AVERT, http://www.avert.orglaids-history-86.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013).
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civil rights concerns remain in place.t"' The focus of the 2010 International
AIDS Conference was "Rights Here, Right Now," highlighting the need for
access to health care and treatments for people living with HIV.1°6 On the
civil rights front, HIV-positive individuals continue to struggle, in general,
to overcome societal hurdles. 07 Not until 2009, for example, did President
Obama lift the travel ban for people living with HIV/AIDS who wished
to visit the United States. 108 Discrimination in health care, particularly in
the refusal to provide treatment 9 and discrimination in employment, are
among the most tangible forms of civil rights violations against people
living with HIV1 0 At the same time, what the disease itself means in terms
of medical prognosis and social costs has changed over time. While HIV is a
manageable illness today, it comes with the new medical costs of long-term
treatment and the social costs of living with an illness that some members
of society still associate with reckless, immoral, or aberrant behaviors.
1o5 Bernard Lo & Leslie E. Wolf, AIDS: Health Care and Research Issues, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 129, 129 (Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004).
io6 Conference Overview, AIDS 201o, http://www.aidszolo.orglDefault.aspx?pageld=i69 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013).
107 Gregory M. Herek, AIDS and Stigma, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST I io6, I Io6 (1999).
Io8 Victoria Colliver, Obama Lifts HIV Travel Ban for Visitors to U.S.; Travel Regulations, S.E
CHRON., Oct. 31, 2oo9, at A8.
109 See, e.g., Bragdon v.Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,631 (1998) (finding disability-based discrimination
when a dentist refused to treat an HIV-positive woman); Rose v. Cahee, 727 F Supp. 2d 728
(E.D. Wis. 2oio) (order denying motion for summary judgment in part and granting in part)
(alleging disability and HIV-based discrimination when a prison doctor refused to perform
surgery on an HIV-positive inmate). See generally Scott Burris, Dental Discrimination Against the
HIV-lnfected: Empirical Data, Law and Public Policy, 13 YALE J. REG. 1, 35-36 (1996) (describing
barriers to accessing dental care); KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE HEALTHCARE EXPERIENCES
OF WOMEN WITH HIV/AIDS: FULL REPORT OF FINDINGS 26-28 (2003), available at http://www.
google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd= I &ved=oCDIQFjAA&url=http%
3A%2F%2Fhivlawandpolicy.org%zFresources%2Fdownload%2F 148&ei=Om7vUOjdlPOqo
AHF8YCoBQ&usg=AFQjCNHMblmdnFaWo7v6XmJ8VMXAnzVRWg&bvm=bv. 13577001
87,d.dmQ&cad=rja (providing examples of refusal to treat women with HIV and poor medical
care for the population).
SIo See, e.g., Sarah R. Christie, AIDS, Employment, and the Direct Threat Defense: The Burden
of Proof and the Circuit Court Split, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 255 (2007) (describing the
employment discrimination obstacles that people living with HIV/AIDS face); Hayley
Gorenberg, Confronting HIV Discrimination in the Workplace, 31 HUMAN RIGHTS 16, 6 (2004)
(chronicling the case of an entertainer who was fired from his job because of fears of HIV-
transmission in the workplace); Alix R. Rubin, HIV Positive, Employment Negative? HIV
Discrimination Among Health Care Workers in the United States and France, 17 COMp. LAB. L.J. 398,
414-17 (1996) (providing examples of employment discrimination against workers with HIV
in the health care sector).
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B. HIV in the Criminal Justice System Today
The interplay between HIV and the U.S. criminal justice system
dates back at least to 1987 when the Alabama courts considered whether
attempted HIV transmission could be criminalized."' In Brock v. State,
an HIV-positive inmate living on an AIDS ward of an Alabama prison
allegedly became aggressive toward a police officer and bit him."' He was
charged with attempted murder and two counts of assault. The officer did
not test positive for HIV.113 The jury acquitted Brock of the attempted
murder charge, but convicted him of first-degree assault." 4 That charge
requires "intent to cause serious physical injury to another person ... by
means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." " On appeal, Brock's
conviction was downgraded to third-degree assault when the court found
that, contrary to the prosecutor's argument, Brock's mouth and teeth were
not dangerous weapons merely because he was HIV-positive. Even though
the CDC disputes the likelihood of transmitting HIV by biting someone,
several states" 6 continue to prosecute and criminalize HIV exposure due
to spitting or biting."7
At least thirty-six states have laws criminalizing certain forms of
behavior of people living with HIV, including spitting, biting, and
consensual sexual activity."8 Scholars and advocates have argued, and the
Obama Administration has adopted as policy, that all efforts to criminalize
the unintentional transmission of HIV run counter to the public health
III Brock v. State, 555 So. 2d 285, 286-88 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
112 Id. at 286.
113 Id.
114 Id.
S15 ALA. CODE § I3A-6-20 (1987).
116 United States v. Sturgis, 48 F3 d 784, 785 (4th Cir. 1995); Campbell v. State, No. o5-o8-
00736-CR, 2oo9 WL 2o25344, at * I (Tex. App. July 14, 2009); Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559,
561 (Tex. App. 1992). See Josh Mrozinski, Inmate Charged With Assault for Spitting, Wyo. COUNTY
PRESS EXAMINER (Jan. 14, 2009), http://wcexaminer.com/?p=8454. See generally Rene Bennett-
Carlson, Ending & Defending Against HIV Criminalization, HIV LAw AND POLICY (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/view/564.
117 Questions andAnswers: HIV Transmission, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/transmission.htm (last modified Mar. 25, 2010).
I18 HIV Ciminalization Fact Sheet, CENTER FOR HIV L. AND POC (Dec. 2,2010), http://www.
hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/view/56o (follow "Click here to download this document"
hyperlink). See also Kaiser Family Found., Criminal Statutes on HIV Transmission, 2oo,
STATE HEALTH FACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=569&cat= I
(last updated July 12, 20io) (listing the thirty-seven applicable states as: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin).
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agenda of encouraging HIV testing, prevention, and treatment."9 Even
though they have garnered some attention, intentional cases are rare.2 0
The more pragmatic problem is not the criminal transmission of the
HIV virus, but the treatment of incarcerated individuals with HIV. In
2005, the Department of Justice estimated that almost two percent of state
inmates and one percent of federal inmates are HIV-positive-a rate of
infection two and a half times higher than the general population.12 1 In
1997, between approximately twenty-two to thirty-one percent of people
living with HIV/AIDS passed through the incarceration system."2 2 Among
the concerns that HIV-positive inmates face, regardless of the crimes they
committed, are inadequate access to health care, violations of their civil
rights, and stigmatization.2 3 In a 2008 study, U.S. psychologists working in
the South reported that fellow inmates and prison staff regarded people
living with HIV/AIDS more negatively than inmates with other diseases,
such as cancer, heart disease, or diabetes.2 4 Narratives of how HIV was
acquired through intravenous drug use or homosexual sex clouded the
HIV-negative inmates' and staff members' perceptions of the HIV-
positive inmate population. Some of these HIV-negative people had fears
about the transmission of HIV through casual contact. 2 The researchers
noted in a subsequent article that a culture of stigma guided decisions
among all inmates to not receive HIV testing, not disclose positive status,
and not seek treatment.2 6
1 19 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (201 O),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defauItlfiles/uploads/NHAS.pdf; Scott Burris &
Edwin Cameron, The Case Against Criminalization of HIV Transmission, 300 JAmA 578, 578-8o
(2008).
120 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV PREVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AT A CRITICAL CROSSROADS (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/reports/pdf/
hiv.prev-us.pdf.
121 LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: HIV IN PRISONS, 2005,
1-3 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/hivpo5.pdf.
122 Theodore M. Hammett, et al., The Burden of Infectious Disease Among Inmates of and
Releaseesfrom U.S. Correctional Facilities, 1997, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1789, 1791-92 (2002).
123 See John D. Kraemer, Screening of Prisoners for HIV" Public Health, Legal, and Ethical
Implications, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 187, 192-93 (2009); Kari Larsen, Deliberately
Indifferent.- Government Response to HIV in U.S. Prisons, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 251,
268-78 (2008).
124 Valerian J. Derlega, et al., AIDS Stigma Among Inmates and Staff in a USA State Prison, 19
INT'L J. STD & AIDS 259, 261 (2008).
125 Id. at 262.
126 See Valerian Derlega, et al., Inmates with HI, Stigma, and Disclosure Decision-making, 15 J.
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 258, 266 (2010).
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C. The Endurance of Stigma
Negative public reactions to HIV as a deadly threat have not been
quashed after three decades of experience with the illness.12 7 Stigma is one
of the defining aspects of living with HIV/AIDS.'28 As I will discuss in the
context of the cases in Part III, stigma, whether in prison environments,
courts, or local communities, is potentially related to causal stories about
how the disease is acquired: homosexual sex, unsafe sex, promiscuity, and
intravenous drug use.12 9
In a 2000 survey of 5641 people on questions related to HIV knowledge
and stigmatizing attitudes within the United States, approximately forty
percent of respondents thought that HIV could be acquired by sharing
a glass or being sneezed or coughed on by people- with HIV. Almost
nineteen percent of respondents believed that people who acquired the
disease through sex or drug use "have gotten what they deserve." 30 Men,
whites, people fifty-five or older, those with only a high school education,
those with an income less than $30,000, and people in poorer health than
others were more likely to hold stigmatizing attitudes toward people
living with HIV/AIDS, with the most significant clustering among those
in poorer health (23.6%) and people fifty-five or older (30%). 1' People
correctly informed about HIV transmission (14%) were less likely to give
a stigmatizing response than those who were not (25%).13 There was little
difference between geographic regions in the representation of people
with stigmatizing responses, with all regions having a range between
approximately eighteen and twenty-percent: Northeast (18.1%), Midwest
(19.9%), South (17.9%), and West (19%). 13
The most obvious problem with the survey was its reliance on just
one question to capture the presence of HIV stigma. Stigma has broader
meaning and effects.1 4 The study highlighted that cultural meanings
are closely related to the view of HIV as a life-threatening disease, the
127 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REV. 397,484-
86 (2000) (arguing that HIV is one of the most stigmatized categories of disability).
128 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, HIVRelated Knowledgeand Stigma, 49 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. o62, I062 (2000).
129 See Lawrence B. Solum, Narrative, Normativity, and Causation, 20 10 MICH. ST. L. REV. 597,
602 (2010) ("[Nlarratives assume that human behavior is caused by the beliefs and desires of
individuals.").
13o HIV Related Knowledge and Stigma, supra note 128, at i062.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at io63.
134 Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Disability Discrimination in America: HIV/AIDS and Other Health
Conditions, 281 JAMA 745, 746 (I999) (finding that HIV's "social stigma transforms the way a
person is seen in the family, at work, and in the community; and the person's health and life
span potentially are severely impacted").
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association of HIV with other stigmatized behaviors (e.g., homosexuality,
drug addiction, prostitution, and promiscuity), and inaccurate information
about transmission. Stigma is also linked to religious or moral beliefs
attributing HIV to a lack of personal responsibility or moral failings and
deviance. 3 ' These ideas about the disease itself and the individual's role
in acquiring it permeate work places, health care, government, and policy.
In the United States, for example, the UNAIDS 2008 Report on the global
AIDS pandemic reported that twenty-seven percent of people surveyed
would not want to work closely with a woman infected with HIV13 6 Issues
surrounding stigma are further complicated by community size and gender
differences, as well as whether or not HIV stigma is measured from the
perspective of people living with the illness or people who are HIV-
negative.'37
In conducting a meta-analysis of the HIV stigma literature from 2000-
2007, researchers noted that high experienced stigma levels were positively
correlated with low social support, poor physical and mental health, and
with low income for people living with HIV/AIDS.135 The researchers then
suggested that one of the barriers to understanding the interplay of HIV
stigma and social, economic, and physical wellness factors was the lack of
conceptually consistent methods of defining and researching stigma. 13 9
This lack of consistency makes capturing stigma's effects, say in the courts
and prisons, difficult.
D. HIV, Stigma, and Sentencing
Perhaps most telling about the social stigma of HIV is its effect on
criminal sentencing. 140 As a health condition, HIV generally has not
been accepted as grounds for downward departure in sentencing in U.S.
federal courts when applying the "extraordinary physical impairment"
language of §5H1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 141 The
135 HIV & AIDS Stigma and Discrimination, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-stigma.
htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
136 UNAIDS, 2oo8 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 83 (2OO8), available at http://
www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyourepidemic/epidemiologypublications/2oo8reprton
theglobalaidsepidemic/.
137 Adam Gonzalez et al., Size Matters: Community Size, HIV Stigma, and Gender Differences, 13
AIDS & BEHAV. 1205 (2009).
138 C. Logie & Tahany M. Gadalla, Meta-Analysis of Health and Demographic Correlates of
Stigma Towards People Living with HIV, 2 1 AIDS CARE 742, 749 (2009).
139 Id. at 750.
140 See Ann F Hammond, AIDS in Correctional Facilities: A New Form of the Death Penalty.i, 36
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 167 (1989) (suggesting the lack of testing and segregation of
the prison population enhances sentencing for crimes).
141 James C. MacGillis, The Dilemma of Disparity: Applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
to Downward Departures Based on HIV Infection, 81 MINN. L. REV. 229, 245-47 (1996); Reid J.
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sentencing guidelines themselves were guided by desires to reduce
disparities in sentencing by implementing a "grid" system of sentencing
possibilities that provided a range. 4 They replaced a more rehabilitative
approach to sentencing with one oriented toward desert, incapacitation,
and deterrence.'43 The grid-system is based on a study of community
sentencing patterns, as well as considerations about a defendant's criminal
history and the crime itself.4' Once a judge determines the offense
level on the vertical axis and the criminal history on the horizontal axis
of the grid, the judge may go above or beyond that sentencing range-a
departure-but only if he or she provides a justification. The system, while
striving toward uniformity in sentencing and assuming that the average
sentence is appropriate in most cases, allows for "departures" based on
specific offender characteristics, such as physical condition, where such a
departure may distinguish the "case from the typical cases covered by the
guidelines," reduce costs associated with incarceration in unusual cases, or
"accomplish a specific treatment purpose."'45 These departures, however,
are made only in extraordinary situations, supporting the goal of the
Guidelines in eliminating the kind of ad hoc individualization of sentences
that was formerly part of the system.146 While resistance to individualizing
sentences or departing downward for all HIV-positive murder defendants
is understandable to some extent, HIV is arguably the very definition of an
extraordinary physical impairment.
In state courts that examine HIV as a potential mitigating factor, the
reception has been similarly chilly. For example, of the thirty-six cases that
I examined, only the court in State v. Banks seemed willing to consider
it as a mitigating factor, and that was in the context of a claim that the
HIV caused serious mental illness for the defendant and had resulted in
suicidal tendencies.'47 The court noted that Banks had "difficulties" when
he discovered at age sixteen that he was HIV-positive, but it also made
much of the fact that he never told his former girlfriend about his status or
took his HIV medication with regularity.'48 The latter point was made in a
paragraph of aggravating factors, leading with a statement about his criminal
Schar, Downward Sentencing Departures for HIV-Infected Defendants: An Analysis of Current Law
anda Framework for the Future, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (1997).
142 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988).
143 Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality ofMercy Must Be Restrained, and OtherLessons in Learning
to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679, 692-93 (1996).
144 Id. at 693-94 ("Horizontal and vertical axes on the sentencing grid ... generate an
intersection in the body of the grid. Each such intersection designates, not a specific sentence,
but a sentencing range expressed in months.").
145 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5HI.4 (2010).
146 Bowman, supra note 143, at 700.
147 State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 9o, 132-33 (Tenn. 2oo8).
148 Id. at 164.
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record of assault, battery, and domestic violence. I4 9 Banks countered, on
appeal, that the prosecutor committed reversible error and violated his due
process rights when she made a slippery slope argument about his HIV
status. The prosecutor argued: "If I give weight to the fact that he's HIV
[positive], what else do I give weight to those that have cancer and other
diseases and tumors and high blood pressure?"'' I 0 The Court sentenced
Banks to death.'
E. HIV-Positive Community ' Responses to Stigma
Reactions to such social and legal barriers have not been passive on
the parts of people living with HIV and advocates for HIV health equity
and justice. The Positive Justice Project of the Center for HIV Law and
Policy, for example, directs its efforts toward addressing the creation of
a "viral underclass" and preventing further marginalization. The mission
is to generate a "truly community-driven, multidisciplinary collaboration
to end government reliance on an individual's positive HIV test result as
proof of intent to harm, and the basis for irrationally severe treatment in
the criminal justice system."'151 Similar efforts are underway, led by the
American Bar Association's AIDS Coordinating Committee, to examine the
ways in which HIV has been criminalized in the United States.'53
Human Rights Watch has been involved in efforts to end prison
segregation based on HIV-status. 5 4 In South Carolina and Alabama,
inmates have been forced to wear armbands or other identifications marking
them as HIV-positive and have been housed only with other HIV-positive
inmates.' While these conditions are characterized as "segregation" by a
number of scholars and the Department of Justice, they simply reflect an
ongoing, however troubling, dynamic of HIV stigmatization in society at
large.'1
6
149 Id.
15o Id. at 135.
151 Id. at IO6-07.
152 PositiveJusticeProjectlnitiatives:A New Strategy to EndCriminalPunishmentandDiscrimination
on the Basis of HIV Infection, CENTER FOR HIV L. & Poi'y, http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/
public/initiatives/positivejusticeproject (last visited Jan. 15, 20 13).
153 The Committee held HIV Criminalization Hearings in October zolo. Projects: AIDS
Coordinating Committee, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/individual-rights/projects/
aidscoordinating-project/projects.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
154 ACLU, SENTENCED TO STIGMA: SEGREGATION OF HIV-PosITIVE PRISONERS IN ALABAMA
AND SOUTH CAROLINA 4 (2Oio), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/defaultlfiles/reports/
healtho41 owebwcover.pdf.
155 Id. at 26.
156 In June 2oIo, the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division sent a letter to South
Carolina prison directors demanding an end to segregation policies based on HIV. Greg
Collard, Justice Department Demands SC Prison System Ends Segregation of HIV Inmates, WFAE
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In the past decade, a significant portion of the research related to stigma
has seemed to shift toward a global focus, with particular energies directed
toward Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South America, and, to a lesser
extent, Asia. "7 This recognition of HIV stigma as a global pandemic in itself
brings with it both positive effects and the unfortunate implication that the
United States has somehow effectively addressed HIV as a disease and
any associated stigma. Some advocates have suggested that the decline in
interest and research in AIDS in the United States is related to the loss of
members of the activism community from the disease itself, as well as the
rise of effective antiretroviral medications that seemed to address part of
the medical issue and eased some fears (and attention) among heterosexual
people."' 8
Efforts such as the People Living with HIV Stigma Index ("Index")
shift the conversation back to examining and charting stigma patterns
comprehensively, and include European and North American countries.5 9
The Index directs its efforts toward people living with HIV to understand
the experience of stigma and to combat negative public attitudes toward the
disease, while increasing resources for care and support. 60 This initiative
and others are laudable and keep stigma at the center of a discussion about
how society addresses HIV care and treatment as well as the inclusion of
people living with HIV/AIDS. However, even more research on stigma
is needed in the United States.16' No similar index breaks down stigma
state-by-state in a comprehensive way, which could be one critical area
of research development in understanding its effects, if any, on courts'
decision-making and sentencing trends in particular jurisdictions.
(Aug. 4, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.wfae.org/post/ustice-department-demands-sc-prison-
system-ends-segregation-hiv-inmates; see also Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing
Transparency andAccountability to CriminalJustice Institutions in the South, 22 S'TA. L. & Polgv REV.
455, 477-78 (zo ) (discussing the failure to provide minimally adequate care to segregated
HIV inmates in Alabama).
157 Anish P. Mahajan et al., Stigma in the HIV/AIDS Epidemic: A Review of the Literature and
Recommendations for the Way Forward, 22 AIDS S67-S79 (Supp. 2 2008).
158 See Elizabeth Pisani, AIDS into the 21z' Century: Some Critical Considerations, 8 REPROD.
HEALTH MATERS 63,65 (2000) (suggesting interest has declined because people do not like
to recognize behaviors that spread the virus).
159 Partnership, ThE PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV STIGMA INDEX, http://www.stigmaindex.org/3 i/
partnership/partnership.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). The Index is a collaboration of the
United Kingdom Department for International Development, the International Planned
Parenthood Federation, UNAIDS, the Global Network of People Living with HIV (GNP+),
and the International Community of Women Living with HIV (ICW).
16o Aims of the Index: The Process, THE PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV STIGMA INDEX, http://www.
stigmaindex.org/l 25/aims-of-the-index/the-process.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
161 See Mahajan et al., supra note 157, at S74 (suggesting that much of the research about
stigma in the United States was conducted by college students and directed at disseminating
factual information about HIV that might reduce barriers to living in the community for
people living with HIV/AIDS).
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III. HIV AS PUNISHMENT AND THE PUNISHMENT OF HIV: CASES AS STUDIES
In this Part, I will use some of the most interesting, and a bit perplexing,
cases from my study as case studies to suggest potential relationships
between sentencing outcomes and HIV status and stigma. I treat these
cases qualitatively and provide some statistics, but only to describe
and condense overall phenomena. The use of cases as studies unto
themselves to provide windows into underlying phenomena is a staple
of legal scholarship and pedagogy. 6 As Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross
have cautioned, reducing cases to mere variables fails to capture the role
of doctrine in judicial decision-making.163 In heeding this warning, I use
the cases as windows into the interaction of HIV and murder sentencing
by probing the attitudes, ideologies, and legal doctrines embedded in
them. The cases reveal themes not only about punishment, but also about
what are appropriate sanctions for actors that possess certain perceived
characteristics and lifestyles.
Adding yet another layer of nuance to this analysis is the issue of
disability in these decisions. As disability studies scholars Vicki Lewis and
Paul Longmore have explored in their work, people with illnesses and
disabilities, such as HIV, are often cast in the roles of "victims and villains"
in society.164 This thread of victimization runs throughout the cases and
results in disparate sentencing outcomes for HIV-positive criminal victims
and defendants. 6s Some common themes emerge, however, and cases that
162 But see David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U.
L. REv. 68I, 684-85 (2007) (arguing that the new legal realists have missed the opportunity
to be methodical in case analysis and suggesting that they begin to examine entire court
dockets, also known as "docketology"); Kay L. Levine, The Law is Not the Case: Incorporating
Empirical Methods into the Culture of Case Analysis, 17 U. FLA. J. L. & PuB. PoCY 283, 285 (zoo6)
(warning that teaching students to extrapolate to what the law is based on one case misses the
complexities of law and judicial decision-making).
163 Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, Ioo Nw. U. L. REv. 517,
524-25 (2oo6).
164 See VICTORIA ANN LEWIS, BEYOND VICTIMS AND VILLAINS: CONTEMPORARY PLAYS BY
DISABLED PLAYWRIGHTS (2oo6). See also Paul K. Longmore & David Goldberger, The League of
the Physically Handicapped and the Great Depression: A Case Study in the New Disability History, 87 J.
AM. HIsT. 888,895-96 (2000) (describing the "victims and villains" phenomenon as a "cultural
motif in which disabled figures embodied the loss of control and the dependency Americans
have found so troubling and displaced onto outsider figures").
165 See, e.g., James Dawes, Narrating Disease. AIDS, Consent, and the Ethics of Representation, 43
Soc. TExT, Autumn 1995, at 27, 35-37 (discussing the dangers of victims and villains AIDS
narratives); Thomas H. Murray, The Poisoned Gift: AIDS and Blood, 68 MILBANK 0. 205, 216
(Supp. 2i99o ) (describing how the gay community was depicted as villainous when HIV
infection was linked to blood banks); M. Spriggs & T Charles, Should HIV Discordant Couples
Have Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies?, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 325, 327 (2003) (linking
concerns about risk and the transmission of HIV to depictions of people living with the virus
as victims and villains).
[Vol. 1I
THE SENTENCE OF HIV
seem divergent initially end up together, providing an explanation of the
possible role of HIV in the criminal courts. In an effort to recognize that
any theory about HIV may be affected by an individual's role in the case,
I present both case studies of HIV-positive defendants and victims. Both
perspectives assist in understanding the ways in which HIV is handled by
the courts and potentially punished by the courts as well, as explored fully
in the final section of this article.
A. Overview of the Cases: Descriptive Data
While this project is not empirically quantitative, it benefits from an
overall description of the case data and trends. I present this information
in text and in the accompanying Tables to offer a general picture of the
defendants and victims as populations; the cases themselves will add
another layer of detail and nuance. Like other murder cases, these cases
generally involve people with difficult, tumultuous lives, financially and
socially. The cases were split relatively equally between HIV-positive
defendants' 66 and victims.'67 Most of the cases discussed a history of
substance use by the defendant, victim, or both. The cases that stand
in contrast are those involving a cheating spouse or heterosexual sexual
partners where fears about the transmission of HIV fueled the murder.'68
166 Rachal v. Quarterman, 265 Fed. App'x 37 1, 375 (5th Cir. Tex. 2008); United States v. Wilk,
366 F Supp. 2d 1 178, 1183 (S.D. Fla. 2005), afftd, 452 F3d 12o8 (i Ith Cir. 2006); United States
v. Peoples, 74 E Supp. 2d 9 3 0,933 (W.D. Mo. 1999);Tokarv. Bowersox, F. Supp. 2d 986, fou
(E.D. Mo. 1998); People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302, 1309 (Colo. App. 1992); Caraballo v. State, 39
So. 3d 1234, 1242 (Fla. 2010); State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 136 (Fla. 2003); Jones v. Moore,
794 So. 2d 579,583 n.4 (Fla. 2001); Wainwright v. State, 704 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1997); People
v. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d 1129, 1 147 (Ill. 1998); State v. Jordan, 728 So. 2d 954, 965 (La. Ct. App.
i999); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 711 N.E.2d 571,573 (Mass. 1999); Leonard v. State, 969 Pzd
288, 293 (Nev. 1998); State v. Brewington, 532 S.E.ad 496, 513 (N.C. 2ooo); State v. Lemons,
5o S.E.2d 309,325 (N.C. 1998); State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3 d 90, 113 (Tenn. 2oo8).
167 Nance v. Norris, 392 E3d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 2004); Peoples, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 933; People
v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980, 1035 (Cal. 1996); People v. Gallon, No. Co39332, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 7827, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2003); Coney, 845 So. 2d at 136; People v. Nieves,
737 N.E.ad 150, 152 (I11. aooo); State v. Cook, 913 P.2d 97, I t6 (Kan. 1996); State v. Divers,
681 So. 2d 320, 322 (La. 1996); State v. Lathan, 953 So. 2d 890, 895 (La. Ct. App. 2007); State
v. Young, 569 So. ad 570, 572 (La. Ct. App. 199o); Commonwealth v. Groome, 755 N.E.ad
1224, 1232 (Mass. 2001); State v. Knight, 459 S. E.2d 481,485 (N.C. 1995); State v. Warren, No.
oICoI-971o-CC-o0455, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1123, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct.
28, 1998); State v. Hudson, No. 3, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 773, at * 14-15 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Nov. 8, 1989); Vinson v. State, No. o6- 9 8-ooI27-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 938, at *8
(Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, I999); Cruz v. State, 877 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Macom, No. 34022-I-I, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1455, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1997).
168 Norris, 392 F3d at 288; Peoples, 74 E Supp. 2d at 931; People v. Mills, 226 P3 d 276, 290
(Cal. 2oio); Coney, 845 So. 2d at 136; Divers, 681 So. 2d at 322; Jordan, 728 So. 2d at 957;
Groome, 755 N.E.2d at 1232; Cruz, 877 S.W.2d at 865; Warren, t998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
1123, at *2; Hudson, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 773, at *2-3 (avoiding a discussion of their
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The differences between the HIV-positive victim and defendant
populations come out in the sentencing patterns. Around sixty-percent
of the HIV-positive defendants received death sentences169 whereas
death sentences were applied in less than twenty-five percent of the
cases involving HIV-positive victims.170 Simply put, the majority of death
penalty outcomes involved HIV-positive defendants, whereas the majority
of cases with sentences for life or a matter of years involved HIV-positive
victims. However, a substantial number of the life sentences involved cases
where both the victim and the defendant were HIV-positive.171
Death penalty sentences, as might be expected, were more common
in cases involving more than murder alone. Defendants were more likely
to get a death sentence in cases involving murder with a sex crime, in
comparison to murder with a crime not of a sexual nature. In the two cases
where murder, a sex crime, and another crime happened, the defendants
received the death penalty; ' a third case was pending appeal at the time
of conducting this study. 73
TABLE I:
LIKELIHOOD OF DEATH SENTENCE BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES
-,Murder accompanied by a sex crime and another
s rime: e not of a sexual nature
M eo~ Murder accompanied by a sex crimeI
*J Murder and another crime, not of a sexual nature I
Least 4iMurder aloneI
relationship status); Macom, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1455, at *2-3.
169 Quarterman, 265 Fed. App'x at 374; Bowersox, i E Supp. zd at 99o; People v. Smith, 68
P3d 302, 312 (Cal. 2003); Moore, 794 So. 2d at 581; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512; Cores, 692
N.E.2d at 1132; Leonard, 969 P.2d at 291; Brewington, 532 S.E.2d at 499; Lemons, 501 S.E.2d at
314; Banks, 271 S.W.3d at io6.
17o Norris, 392 F3d at 286; Mills, 226 P.3d at 288; People v. McDermott, 51 P.3d 874,886 (Cal.
2002); Arias, 913 P.2d at 994; Nieves, 737 N.E.2d at 152.
171 This aspect of the data suggests some of the complications of HIV in the sentencing
process, including desires to protect victims, humanitarian efforts to provide health care in
prison, and questions about the value of HtIV-positive people's lives as viewed through the
eyes of juries and judges.
172 People v. Smith, 68 P3 d 302 (Cal. 2003); Wainwright v. State, 704 SO.2d 511 (Fla. 1997).
173 Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234 (Fla. 2010).
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In terms of social trends, no homosexual defendants were sentenced
to death; all homosexual defendants were sentenced to life. 1 4 Put another
way, death sentences were reserved for heterosexual defendants, or, with
the exception of two cases, 75 for heterosexual victims.
In the fifteen death sentence cases, the races of the defendants were
almost equally divided between white 7 6 and African American 77defendants,
with Hispanic and Native Americans constituting the remaining third. 78
Black defendants, however, were more likely to receive a life sentence than
any other racial group of defendants. 79 White defendants were more likely
to receive a sentence of a matter of years over a death or a life sentence, 180
while black defendants were more likely to be sentenced to life than death
or a sentence of a matter of years."'
Understanding the picture when it comes to victims is also important.
Cases involving black victims often resulted in life sentences, rather than
death sentences or sentences of durations shorter than life.182 Defendants
in cases involving white victims often received the death penalty.18 3 When
it came to victims in the death penalty sentences, there were eight white
174 United States v. Lightfoot, 483 F3d 876, 878 (8th Cit. 2007); United States v. Wilk, 366 E
Supp. 2d 1178 (S.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd, 452 F.3d 12o8 (i ith Cir. 2oo6); Coney, 845 So. 2d at 132;
Divers, 68i So. 2d at 327; Jordan, 728 So. 2d at 956; Cruz, 877 S.W.2d at 864.
175 See People v. McDermott, 51 P3 d 874 (Cal. 2002) (sentencing a homosexual defendant to
the death penalty); People v. Arias, 913 P.ad 980 (Cal. 1996) (same).
176 Norris, 392 F3d 284; Bowersox, I F Supp. 2d at 999; Mills, 226 P3d at 293; McDermott, 51
P3d 874; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 514.
177 Quarerman, 265 Fed. App'x 371; Smith, 68 P.3d at 341; Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579
(Fla. 2001); Leonard, 969 P.2d at 294; Lemons, 501 S.E.2d at 325; Banks, 271 S.W 3 d at i Io. I use
African American and black interchangeably in this article.
178 Arias, 913 P.ad at 1o25; Nieves, 737 N.E.2d at I52; Cortes, 692 N.E.ad at 1134; State v.
Brewington, 532 S.E.2d 496 (N.C. 2000).
179 United States v. Lightfoot, 483 F3d 87 6,8 7 8 (8th Cir. 2007); Turner v. Wong, 641 E Supp.
2d 10 10, 1112, II I8 (E.D. Cal. 2009); People v. Gallon, No. Co39332, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 7827, at *i (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2003); State v. Spell, No. IK95-Io-oi9o-R1, 2002
Del. Super. LEXIS 46, at *i (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2oo2), aff'd, 803 A.2d 429 (Del. 2002);
Coney, 845 So. 2d at 131, 14o; Divers, 68I So. ad at 327; Jordan, 728 So. ad at 956; State v. Young,
569 So. 2d 570, 571 (La. Ct. App. 199o); Vinson v. State, No. o6-98-oo127-CR, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 938, at *i (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1999).
18o See Norris, 392 E3d at 286; Bowersox, I E Supp. 2d at 990; Mills, 226 P.3d at 288; McDermott,
51 P3 d at 885; Wainwright, 704 So. ad at 512.
i8i See Lightfoot, 483 E3d at 878; Wong, 641 E Supp. 2d at 1112, 11 18; Gallon, 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 7827, at * ; Spell, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 46, at *t; Coney, 845 So. 2d at 131,
140; Divers, 68I So. 2d at 327; Jordan, 728 So. 2d at 956; Young, 569 So. 2d at 571; Vinson, 1999
Tex. App. LEXIS 938, at * i.
I8a Compare Wong, 641 F Supp. ad at 11 i18, and State v. Lathan, 953 So.2d 890, 893 (La. Ct.
App. 2007).
183 Norris, 392 F3 d at 286, 287;. Bowersox, F E Supp. 2d at 990; Mills, 226 P3d at 288;
McDermott, 51 P.3d at 885; Arias, 913 P.ad at 993, 996; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512; Leonard
v. State, 969 P.ad 288, 291 (Nev. 1998); State v. Lemons, 501 S.E.ad 309,314,315 (N.C. 1998).
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victims, 184 three Hispanic victims,"s' one black victim, 1 6 one Native
American victim, 87 one Asian victim, 8' and one Middle Eastern victim."9
TABLE 2:
LIKELIHOOD OF TYPES OF SENTENCES BASED ON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
DEFENDANT OR VICTIM
SENTENCES OP LESS
DEATH SENTENCES LIFE SENTENCES THN 
LE
THAN LIFE
Cases involving HIV-positive
HIV-positive victims Cases involving
defendants Cases involving HIV-positive HIV-positive victims
victims and defendants
Heterosexual Heterosexual
defendants defendants
Cases involving Cases involving homosexual Cases involving
heterosexual victims victims heterosexual victims
No clear racial Minority defendants
connection for Black defendants from varied
defendants backgrounds
Cases with victimsCases involving Cases involving black victims from a variety of racial
white victims backgrounds
Finally, in ten cases, the prosecutor used the defendant or victim's
HIV status as part of the case. 19° These cases were fairly equally divided
184 Norris, 392 E3 d at 286-87; Bowersox, I E Supp. 2d at 990; Mills, 226 P3 d at 288;McDermott,
51 P.3d at 885; Arias, 913 P.2d at 993, 996; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512; Leonard, 969 P2d at
291; Lemons, 501 S.E.2d at, 314,315-
185 Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 58I (Fla. 2001); People v. Nieves, 737 N.E.zd 150, 152 (I11.
2000); People v. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d 1129, 1132, 1134 (111. 1998).
I86 Rachal v. Quarterman, 265 Fed. App'x 371 (5 th Cir. Tex. 2008).
187 State v. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d 496,499 (N.C. 2ooo).
188 People v. Smith, 68 P3d 302,325 (Cal. 2003).
I89 State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3 d 90, 1o6, 107 (Tenn. 2oo8).
i9o Tokar v. Bowersox, i E Supp. 2d 986, 1004 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Smith, 68 P3d at 337; People
v. McDermott, 51 P3d 874, 907 (Cal. 2002); Wainwright v. State, 704 So. 2d 511, 512, 513 n.4
(Fla. 1997); State v. Cook, 913 Pad 97, 116, 1I8 (Kan. 1996); State v. Divers, 681 So. 2d 320,322
(La. 1996); State v. Young, 569 So. 2d 570,572 (La. Ct. App. I99O); State v. Lemons, 5o S.E.2d
309, 325 (N.C. 1998); Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 113-14; State v. Hudson, No. 3, 1989 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 773, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 1989).
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between those involving defendants 9' and victims with HIV. 19 In sixty-
percent of the cases where the prosecutor made use of the HIV status, the
defendant received the death penalty.1 93 With the exception of one of these
cases, 194 they all involved situations where the defendant was HIV-positive
and the victim was not.
This brief overview of the cases provides a sketch of their contours.
As noted, this dataset is small and may represent issues of selection bias.
These descriptive statistics, however, offer some way of grasping the entire
set as a whole without making claims about HIV in murder cases in general.
As tempting an argumentative shortcut as it might be, I cannot assume that
these descriptive data prove or disprove larger theoretical arguments about
race, sexual orientation, HIV status, victimhood, or prosecutorial ethics.
The overall picture is both supplemented and complicated by delving into
some of the facts and controversies of the cases themselves.
B. Defendants and Villains
I begin the analysis of the cases themselves by looking at the sixteen
cases involving HIV-positive defendants;' in the next section, I will
change perspective and examine the dimensions of the cases involving
HIV-positive victims.'96 One additional case was unclear but seemed to
1 91 Bowersox, i F. Supp. 2d at iooi; Smith, 68 P.3 d at 337; Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512; Lemons,
5oi S.E.2d at 325; Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 113.
192 McDermott, 51 P.3 d at 906; Cook, 913 P.zd at 116; Divers, 681 So. 2d at 322; Young, 569 So.
2d at 572; Hudson, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 773, at *14.
193 Bowersox, i E Supp. 2d at 990; Smith, 68 P3d at 312; McDermott, 51 P.3 d at 885; Wainwright,
704 So. 2d at 512; Lemons, 501 S.E.2d at 314; Banks, 271 S.W.3 d at io6.
194 McDermott, 51 P.3 d at 906.
195 Rachal v. Quarterman, 265 Fed. App'x 371 (5th Cir. Tex. 2oo8); United States v. Wilk, 3 66
F Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (S.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd, 452 E3d i2o8 (i ith Cit. 2oo6); United States
v. Peoples, 74 F Supp. 2d 930, 933 (W.D. Mo. 1999); Bowersox, 1 E Supp. 2d at iooi; People
v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302, 1309 (Colo. App. 1992); Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3 d 1234, 1242 (Fla.
2OO); State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 136 (Fla. 2003); Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 583 n.4
(Fla. 2001); Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512; People v. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d 1129, 1147 (Ill 1998);
State v. Jordan, 728 So. 2d 954,965 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 711 N.E.2d
571, 573 (Mass. 1999); Leonard v. State, 969 P.2d 288,293 (Nev. 1998); State v. Brewington, 532
S.E.2d 496,513 (N.C. 2ooo); Lemons, 501 S.E.2d at 325; Banks, 271 S.W.3 d at 113.
196 Nance v. Norris, 392 F3d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 2004); Peoples, 74 E Supp. 2d at 933; People
v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980, 1035 (Cal. 1996); People v. Gallon, No. Co393 3 2, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 7827, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2003); Coney, 845 So. 2d at 136; People v. Nieves,
737 N.E.2d 150, 152 (I11. 2000); Cook, 913 P2d at 116; Divers, 681 So. 2d at 322; State v. Lathan,
953 So. 2d 890, 895 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Young, 569 So. 2d at 572; Commonwealth v. Groome,
755 N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (Mass. 2001); State v. Knight, 459 S.E.zd 481,485 (N.C. 1995); State v.
Warren, No. OICOI-9710-CC--00 4 5 5, 1998Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1123, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Oct. 28, 1998); Hudson, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 773, at *14-15; Vinson v. State,
No. o6-98-oo127-CR, i999 Tex. App. LEXIS 938, at *8 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. iz, 1999); Cruz
v. State, 877 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. Ct.App. 1994); State v. Macom, No. 34022-1-I, 1997 Wash.
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imply that the defendant had HIV1 97 These cases largely involved racial
minority, heterosexual defendants acting against heterosexual victims1 98
in jurisdictions where the death penalty was available.' 99 The crimes
committed were generally murder along with another crime that was not of
a sexual nature. Defendants, perhaps not surprisingly, were more likely to
get death if their crime involved more than one victim (n=5, four out of five
of those cases went for death). Death sentences were not given in any cases
in the dataset where the victim was also HIV-positive.
Most relevant to this study was the way in which the defendant treated
his HIV status in relation to the case. In five of the cases, the defendant
attempted to argue that his HIV status made him suicidal or mentally ill. 00
In all but one of those cases, the defendant received the death penalty. 01
In only one case did the court consider the HIV to be a mitigating
factor--State v. Banks."0 ' In that case, the defendant also argued that he
was suicidal. The prosecutor used the HIV status as part of his case. The
court viewed Banks as being secretive about the HIV and noted his risky
behavior as evidenced by the HIV, and claimed that the defendant was
using the HIV to gain the court's sympathy.03 Banks received the death
penalty."' HIV was not a strong enough mitigating factor given the
defendant's background and familial-like relationship with the victim.0 5
App. LEXIS 1455, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1997).
197 Smith, 68 P.3d at 337.
198 In one case, People v. Cortes, the victims engaged in sodomy and sexual play with the
defendant on previous occasions, but it is clear from the facts of the case that the defendant
Cortes did not identify as being a homosexual and the brothers who paid him for sex may not
have either. Cortes, 692 N.E.2d at 1136.
i99 People v. Mills, 226 P.3d 276, 288 (Cal. 2010); Smith, 68 P.3d at 312; People v. Gallon, No.
C039332, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7827, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2003); State v.
Spell, No. IK9 5-1o-oi9o-Ri, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 46, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28,
2002), aff'd, 803 A.2d 429 (Del. 2002); Caraballo, 39 So. 3d at 1238; Moore, 794 So. 2d at 581;
Nieves, 737 N.E.2d at 152-53; Cortes, 692 N.E.2d at 1134; Lathan, 953 So. 2d at 893; Leonard,
969 P.2d at 291; Brewington, 532 S.E.2d at 499; Lemons, 5oi S.E.2d at 314; Banks, 271 S.W.3d at
io6; Vinson, '999 Tex. App. LEXIS 938, at *2; Macom, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1455, at *2-3 .
200 Wilk, 366 E Supp. 2d at 1183; Bowersox, i F. Supp. zd at iooo; Brewington, 532 S.E.zd at
513; Lemons, 501 S.E.2d at 334; Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 133.
201 The exception was United States v. Wilk.
202 Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 133.
203 Id. at I 13, 164.
204 Id. at I66.
205 Id. at 164-65.
[Vol. 1OI
THE SENTENCE OF HIV
TABLE 3:
DESCRIPTIVE SENTENCING DATA FOR HIV-PoSITIVE DEFENDANTS
NUMBER, OUT OF THE 15 HIV+
DEFENDANTS IN DEATH PENALTY
JURISDICTIONS
Sentenced to death 9
Sentenced to life 4
Sentenced to a matter of years 1
Sentence pending 1
Racial minorities 12
4
Homosexual (all sentenced to life)
1. Death.-I begin with a case involving the death sentence that is not
all that unusual in its facts if one were to remove HIV from the picture.
Anthony Wainwright and Richard Hamilton escaped from a North Carolina
prison, stole a car and guns, and drove to Florida. There they decided to
steal another car from a young mother, raping, strangling, and killing the
woman."0 6 They then drove to Mississippi, engaged in a shootout with
police, and were subsequently arrested."7
When he was arrested, Wainwright shared with officers that he had
AIDS and then later admitted to having kidnapped and raped the victim.208
At the trial phase, as one piece of mitigating evidence, Wainwright's
mother provided testimony that he was a bed-wetter until age fourteen.
The court found six aggravating factors, but no statutory or non-statutory
mitigators.0 9 The court convicted him on charges of first-degree murder,
robbery, kidnapping, and sexual battery, and sentenced him to death.10
On appeal, Wainwright claimed that the court had erred by allowing his
statement to police about his AIDS status to come in as evidence. " The
court found Wainwright's claim about his health status to be without merit
and upheld the death sentence.
2 12
What is unusual about this case then? Along with Wainwright's claim
about the prosecutor making his HIV status an important issue in the case,
he also contended that his status was contrasted with that of the image of a
young mother with two children who, before her untimely death, routinely
2o6 Wainwright v. State, 704 So.2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1997).
207 Id.
2o8 Id.
209 Id. at 512-13.
21o Id. at 513.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 56.
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transported them to preschool. 13 One could argue that HIV was not a
factor in this case-that the details alone were enough to trigger the death
penalty in Florida. However, the court refused to address the ways in which
the contrast between the murderous HIV villain and the victimized mother
could have affected the finding of mitigating and aggravating factors, and
ultimately, the sentencing outcome. 14
While Wainwright, like the other cases involving death penalty outcomes,
may do much to support an argument about the idiosyncrasies of murder
cases as a whole, these cases hang together in an important way. In all of
the death penalty cases, the courts show a reluctance to consider HIV as a
potential mitigating factor or to analyze how HIV might color a sentencing
outcome. This failure to discuss the illness provides as much concern as a
soliloquy on HIV as a dirty disease would be because of the role of courts
in sentencing, the high stakes in these murder cases, and the inability
to discern whether or how HIV affected the outcome. When defendants
are successful in having courts consider, and briefly discuss, HIV and its
potentially negative influence on the case or on the defendant's life, courts
are apt to rush in and disclaim that HIV had any effects. In essence, we are
seeing two approaches to HIV-a failure to engage it, as well as a redefining
of its social meaning.
Take, for example, State v. Tokar, summarized at the beginning of this
article. 15 Tokar burglarized a home, but the occupants came home in the
process of his invasion.116 Realizing that he had been discovered, Tokar
killed the young father of the family by shooting him twice while his
children were nearby. 17 Prior to the trial, Tokar's counsel attempted to
have the court consider his mental health issues related to HIV, claiming
that the HIV had induced dementia and that a continuance was needed
to adequately address his fitness for trial.21 8 The court eventually granted
a continuance, but the defense attorney never submitted any medical
reports concerning those issues or raised the issue of competency to stand
trial after that continuance hearing.1 9
On appeal, Tokar raised several issues including ineffective
representation, failure to consider mitigating circumstances, and error in
admitting "extremely inflammatory evidence" during the penalty phase
about AIDS.2 0 As to the effect that AIDS may have had on the trial, Tokar
213 Id. at 512-13.
214 Seeid. at 512-16.
215 State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1996), appealed and aff'd by Tokar v. Bowersox, iF
Supp. 2d 986 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
2 16 Id. at 756.
217 Id. at 757.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 759.
220 Id. at 761.
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contended that "having the disease is regarded as disgraceful" and that
AIDS results in "'greater loathing than murder does."''" Tokar argued
that the prosecutor's introduction of evidence regarding his diagnosis in
the penalty phase was "irrelevant, prejudicial, and a violation of his Eight
Amendment rights" that allowed jurors to employ "unconstitutional factors
in determining his sentence." ' Drawing on case law involving the reversal
of sentences where pimps and adulterers were concerned, the appellate
court determined that Tokar did not have a claim for reversal."2 3 The
defense had earlier argued that alcohol influenced Tokar's behavior and
the court based its claim on the appropriateness of the AIDS information
as factually relevant to show that perhaps more than alcohol had influenced
his actions. The court noted, "A defendant's character is always relevant
in the sentencing context. The fact that Tokar said he had nothing to lose
because he had the AIDS virus demonstrates his lack of good character and
that alcohol was not the only cause of Tokar's crimes."214 The court went
on to conclude: "the mere fact that the prison-mate's testimony included
information of Tokar's infliction with the AIDS virus did not render the
testimony excessively prejudicial. The trial court did not err." ' 5
Both Tokar and Wainwright seem to be cases involving retributive action
on the part of the state. Both courts used the HIV status of the defendant
to suggest something about their accompanying character and the risk they
presented to society.12 6 HIV was a mark on the defendants. However, at the
same time, the negative aspect of living with HIV is not examined for the
influence it might have had on the objectivity of the judgments themselves
or on the lives of the defendants. Perhaps knowing about the HIV status
does provide a piece in a larger puzzle of who the defendant is as a person.
Still, the larger concern remains that even under a retributive approach, the
punishment meted out may be excessive because the nuances of the cases
defy the simplistic categorization of HIV as evil and threatening.
Ending a defendant's life accomplishes some of the goalsof utilitarianism
by removing a future potential criminal threat, while also accomplishing
the objective of maximizing social well-being by eliminating the carrier
of a potentially fatal virus. Rehabilitation does not appear to be part of the
consideration of the courts in the cases I studied; rather, defendants with
the status of HIV who exhibit other behaviors such as drug use seem to be
treated as being beyond any therapeutic interventions.
221 Id. at 770.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 770 (citation omitted).
225 Id.
226 See id. at 757-58; Wainwright v. State, 704 So.2d 511,5 16 (Fla. 1997).
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2. Life.-Of the four cases involving HIV-positive defendants sentenced
to life in a death penalty jurisdiction, there are several trends. Half of them
involved cases of murder alone, while the others involved other crimes,
none of a sexual nature. One case involved two murders committed by
the defendant. Three out of the four cases involved homosexual victims,
and all of the cases involved homosexual defendants. Two of the cases
involved both homosexual and HIV-positive defendants and victims.
Three defendants were black and one was white, while three victims
were white and one was black. The murders were equally split between
defendants and victims of the same race and black defendants and white
victims. Three of the cases involved defendants and victims with ongoing
sexual relationships and one involved the killing of a police officer when he
was trying to serve an arrest warrant for child pornography."2 7
The cases involving intimates may shed some light on issues, such
as the potential role of HIV in valuing these lives or on the influence of
intimate relationships in sentencing. Consider State v. Jordan, where the
defendant killed his same-sex lover.2 8 The opinion makes much of the
fact that upon first being interrogated by the police, Jordan claimed to not
be gay, but bisexual and celibate. Jordan proceeded to tell the police that
the victim was gay and that early on in their relationship they "might have
engaged in oral sex" but then "denied that they were lovers." 229 Only after
the discussion of sex does the opinion go into the whiskey drinking and the
crack cocaine use of the defendant and the victim. 30 Both the defendant
and the victim were black.
Jordan attempted to tell a narrative of his own victimization by the
deceased, claiming that the victim Hudson had given him Soma, a muscle
relaxant. 31 Jordan then proceeded to make subsequent statements that
were in conflict - that Hudson had drugged him, but yet he was still
coherent enough to attempt to steal Hudson's VCR, and that when Hudson
discovered him, they got into a physical struggle and Hudson died. 32 In a
later statement, Jordan contended that Hudson had drugged him against
his will by putting "white stuff" in his drink and that when he got sleepy,
Hudson tried to take sexual advantage of him by opening the zipper of
his pants. 33 Jordan claimed to refuse the advances and then argued that
rejected and angry, Hudson asked him to leave. 34 According to his version
of the events, Jordan left the apartment, but his car broke down due to tire
227 United States v.Wilk, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 118o (S.D. Fla. 2005).
228 State v. Jordan, 728 So. 2d 954, 956-57 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
229 Id. at 957.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 957-58.
233 Id. at 958.
234 Id.
[Vol. IOI
THE SENTENCE OF HIV
trouble. 35 When he returned to the apartment, he became ensnarled in a
verbal fight with Hudson after Hudson admitted to drugging him. 36 Jordan
was enraged and hit Hudson with a tire wrench, leading to an escalation, in
which he strangled and stabbed Hudson. 37
Jordan was convicted of first-degree murder, with the state seeking the
death penalty.3 The jury was deadlocked on the appropriate punishment
and the court decided to impose a sentence of life with hard labor and no
probation. 39 At trial, Jordan had shared his stories of being sexually pursued
by Hudson over the course of their acquaintance, claiming that Hudson
disrobed, mounted him, and tried to take off Jordan's clothes2 4° He also
claimed that Hudson had pinned him to the wall, "'trying to kiss me ..
• and trying to get into my pants again."'2141 His story at trial was that he
had used the crowbar to protect himself from Hudson's sexual aggressions
and then he must have strangled him during the struggle. 4 Jordan did not
remember strangling Hudson and admitted that he had stolen some of the
victim's electronics. He claimed that earlier statements to the police were
incorrect because "'he had been drinking gin all morning.'
2 43
Jordan also claimed that the detective had screamed at him during
the interrogation and had sat very close and attempted to force his thighs
apart between statements."4 The detective denied this behavior and
rather claimed that Jordan had told him that he was HIV-positive and had
some "type of infection in the genital areas." 245 The detective recounted
that he had likely put his knee between Jordan's legs, but only at the tip
of the knee and barely inside Jordan's legs. z46 He claimed he did this to
keep Jordan's eyes focused on his. The detective also admitted "he feared
contracting AIDS and denied getting very near Jordan."' 47 The court used
this information to dismiss Jordan's complaints about police misconduct.
On appeal, the court upheld Jordan's life sentence with hard labor,
granting no leniency merely because Jordan was HIV-positive. z48 The
court clarified that "hard labor" referred not to the kind of work that Jordan
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 962.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 965.
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might be expected to do as an inmate, but to his "status as a prisoner."' 49 It
further emphasized that some inmates might be incapable of contributing
to the work of the Department of Corrections and that medical care is
provided by the state."
What is most striking about this case is the way in which Jordan himself
enforces norms of heterosexuality and depicts both Hudson and the police
officer as attempting to abuse or seduce him. The court does not seem very
sympathetic to either Hudson or Jordan. They are both black and drug
users. 51 They have engaged in questionable sexual practices, which the
court spends a noticeable amount of the opinion discussing. In responding
to the claims that it had not considered how HIV might affect Jordan while
incarcerated, the court seems to suggest that the state will provide for him
by offering health care. 52
Perhaps Jordan's taking of Hudson's life does not merit the full
punishment powers of the state. They are both figures that seem difficult for
the court to relate to as people, and the actions between them may amount
to somewhat of a wash in terms of social interests. Under a retributive
approach, if desert is measured in part by the value of the victim's life, then
sentencing Jordan to life may be consistent with a sense of proportionality
and justice. Alternatively, this murder case, or its defendant, have not
proven to be so alarming or heinous in the run of murder cases as to trigger
punishment beyond a life sentence. Utilitarian values may also be realized
through the provision of health care and the containment of the virus and
the criminal dangerousness of Jordan. Some citizens and policymakers,
for example, might argue that the state is responding in a charitable or
benevolent way by providing a safe home for Jordan during the course of
his illness where he can be away from the influences of drugs and the streets
and receive adequate medical attention. The pattern, however, of meting
out life sentences for cases involving intimates where the defendant has
HIV does raise some question as to what other factors might be influencing
the courts' decisions.
Feminist legal theorists have drawn important attention to the issues
of gender and intimate relationships relative to levels of punishment for
murder.5 3 Women who kill their spouses are more likely to get charged
with first-degree murder than men who do the same.M4 Some scholars have
argued that this situation reflects not only lingering sexism in the criminal
249 Id.
250 Id. at 966.
251 Id. at 959.
252 Id. at 966.
253 E.g., Margaret Hobday, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of Intimate Violence:
Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1285 (1994).
254 See Laurie 1. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat of Passion Manslaughter and
Imperfect Self Defense, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679, 1682 (1986).
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justice system, but differences in context. 15 The criminal law's approach to
the provocation doctrine, for example, tends to mitigate murders that men
commit against women that appear to be "heat of the moment" or passion
killings.116 Murders committed by women, in contrast, are often the result
of long-standing domestic violence and the factors leading up to them may
be more subtle or drawn out over time, resembling something closer to
premeditation than provocation.257
In the case of same-sex intimates, scholars simply have not done as
much research as they have on gender and heterosexual relationships
to explain how this kind of violence is viewed or addressed by the
courts. Same-sex relationships may involve the same levels of abuse as
heterosexual relationships. 58 Adding further complication, it is unclear
whether or not male-on-male violence that ends in death would be treated
the same as male-on-female violence or female-on-male violence. Some
scholars suggest that in this situation, judges and juries are likely to apply
stereotypes about male sexuality and homosexuality and treat men who
murder their male intimates like women who kill.259 In this set of cases,
however, the courts are not being clear as to whether provocation-based
arguments are more successful or they simply see the threat as being
limited to the encounters between the defendant and the victim. Perhaps,
since that personal dispute is extinguished with the victim's life, then the
problem does not rise to the level of being death-worthy for the defendant.
3. A Matter of Years.-The lone case involving an HIV-positive defendant
sentenced to a matter of years was People v. Baca.6 There is some factual
uncertainty surrounding this case-I am not sure if Baca was homosexual,
but the victim was. Both the victim and the defendant were Hispanic. Baca
claimed that the victim made sexual advances toward him, motivating him
to act in self-defense to kill and then rob him. He was convicted of second-
255 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 607-08 (1986). The Justice Department has estimated that
one-third of all women killed in the United States in 1998 were murdered by their domestic
partners, while less than five percent of male homicides involved intimates. CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANs, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 178247, SPECIAL REPORT:
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000).
256 Taylor, supra note 254, at 1695-96.
257 See Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and JustifiedMercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered
Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 703 (1994) (arguing that battered women often have a
difficult time convincing the court they were acting in self-defense).
258 Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence,
3o VAL. U. L. REV.. 335, 340 (1995).
259 Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome Expert
Testimony for Gay Men and Women Who Kill Abusive Domestic Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379,
1385 (1993).
260 People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302, 1302-04 (Colo. App. 1992).
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degree murder and appealed, claiming among other things that the court
failed to consider his HIV status in sentencing.2 6 '
The trial court jury had been informed that neither sympathy nor
prejudice should influence the verdict. 6 In addressing whether HIV
should have been a mitigating factor in the sentencing, the court recognized
that while HIV is a "condition which is a precursor to AIDS," a sentencing
court has "broad discretion" and an appellate court "must focus on the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the public interest in
safety and deterrence, and evaluate whether the sentence actually imposed
represents a fair accommodation of society's interest and the interest of the
offender." '63 Noting that Colorado had no cases on the books addressing
HIV as a mitigator, the court examined cases from other jurisdictions,
holding that an "affliction with AIDS or HIV does not, by itself, warrant a
reduction of an otherwise appropriate sentence. ' '2 64 The Baca court cited
the comparison in United States v. DePew of AIDS to cancer and "other
terminal or life-threatening conditions" and noted that prisons have staff
and infrastructure to provide "necessary care and treatment." '65
While the court had discretion to impose a sentence ranging from sixteen
to forty-eight years, it settled on forty-five years, noting the "defendant's
psychological problems, his alcohol and drug use," and "high risk to the
community"-not explaining whether that risk was related to his illness,
his drug use, or his criminal history. 66 The lower court also noted that the
sentence could be reevaluated if Baca's health deteriorated "to a point such
that he was no longer a threat to society.' ' z67 The appellate court upheld the
sentence, agreeing that the defendant could not be rehabilitated and that
society needed to be "protected.
2
1
68
Here, the court appears to be treating Baca as a risk, but the perceived
source of that risk remains unclear. Is Baca a risk because he has HIV? His
sentence, framed as a number of years, will allow him to continue to live,
albeit incarcerated, and to receive care during that time in prison-facts
that the court seems to take into account. At the same time, this sentence
could end up being a lifetime for him if his health is compromised. Baca
is presented as someone who is deviant and has some significant personal
issues that are beyond rehabilitation and repair 69 The language of the
court is not focused on what the incarcerated time might offer to Baca in
261 Id. at 1302.
262 Id. at 13o8.
263 Id. at 1309.
264 Id. (emphasis added).
265 Id. (citing United States v. DePew, 751 E Supp. 1195 (E.D. Va. 199o)).
266 Id. at 1309-10.
267 Id. at 1310.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 1309-10.
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making him into a person who could be reintegrated into society. I find
it difficult to tell from this opinion if the court is housing Baca until his
demise or if the court extended some leniency based on the fact that he
was defending sexual advances from a homosexual man.
While Baca has taken a life, perhaps the nuances of the situation dictate
a lesser form of punishment according to principles of desert. An alternative
or accompanying goal might be the utilitarian goal of quarantining the HIV
disease and his criminal behavior until he is debilitated and dependent
enough, health-wise, to no longer pose a threat to society. The court's focus
is not on improving or maintaining Baca's health, but rather on allowing the
HIV to run its course, perhaps as a lesson and form of punishment in itself.
C. Distancing Victims
Seventeen of the thirty-six cases involved HIV-positive victims; an
additional four cases involved victims where HIV-positive status was
implied. In only two of the seventeen cases was the defendant also HIV-
positive. Seven of the HIV-positive victims were also homosexual and
four of the defendants in the seventeen cases were homosexual. Of the
seventeen cases, four were cases where both victim and defendant were
homosexual. Most of the seventeen victims were white and most of the
defendants in those cases were racial minorities (black, Hispanic, and
Native American). Only one of the seventeen cases came from outside
a capital punishment jurisdiction, leaving sixteen cases eligible for a
maximum punishment of death. Of the remaining sixteen cases, only three
resulted in death sentences for the defendant. Nine were life sentences
and the remaining four were sentences ranging from fifteen to twenty-
eight years.
1. Death.-What is telling about the three death sentences in this
population of cases? Additional factual and demographic information is
in order. Even with additional data as enhancement, the small number of
cases in this category and the nuanced treatment of HIV-positive victims
thwart any effort to arrive at general conclusions. Two of the cases involved
murder and another crime, one a sex crime and the other a robbery. The
defendants were not HIV-positive, nor homosexual. One of the victims
was homosexual. Two of the defendants were Hispanic and one was white
and two of the victims were Hispanic and one was white.
If judges and juries can relate to defendants and victims that remind
them of themselves, then these cases involving HIV-positive victims may
turn on the issue of the victim's health status or on other factors, or both.
People v. Nieves raises this question.7 0 It challenges some conventional
notions about the predictability of death sentences given certain factors,
270 People v. Nieves, 737 N.E.2d 150 (I11. 2000)
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such as the notion that the death sentence is more likely in traditional felony
murder cases or cases involving white victims and minority perpetrators.2 7'
Nieves committed murder alone, had one victim (also Hispanic), and
neither man was homosexual."' Nieves killed the defendant Rafael Cuevas
(a.k.a. "Pookie-Pookie") by administering at least six blows to the head. 73
Police found Cuevas' body in an abandoned retail building in Chicago,
where he was living as a squatter, on a "bloodstained mattress" along with
drug paraphernalia. Cuevas tested positive for alcohol use and HIV, but
drug tests on the body returned clean. 74
Nieves, who had also been squatting in the abandoned building, had
known Cuevas for three months and claimed that one night, the victim
asked to die: "Man I tell you this shit you know. I want to die." '75 When
Nieves asked what the "shit" was, the victim responded: "Drugs and
alcohol and things like that" and then told Nieves that he was going to
sleep.276 The defendant went outside, retrieved a two-by-four board, and
struck the victim in the head up to ten times. 77
Family members of the victim testified that he was never upset or
depressed, that he did have a drinking problem and was HIV-positive but
seemed to manage the illness and its effects well. 78 They were not aware
of any desire on his part to end his life. 79 Nieves brought a witness named
Rabbit, who testified as to his statements about Cuevas' desire to die and
reiterated that Nieves had called Cuevas "his street friend" and claimed
that Cuevas "frequently complained that he wanted to die."
'2 80
The defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and his
sentence for death by arguing that his attorney had not argued a "mercy
killing" defense.28 1 The court, on appeal, was not convinced by Nieves'
mercy killing argument, given the facts of the case.82 Nieves had also
271 Nieves, 737 N.E.2d 50; see Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The RacialJustice Act and the
Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2097-99
(2010) (showing that most cases involving the death penalty involve crimes committed by
minorities against white victims, even though most crimes involve perpetrators and victims
of the same race).
272 Nieves, 737 N.E.2d at I53.
273 Id. at 152.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 153.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
28o Id. at 153-54.
281 Id. at 152.
282 Id.
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been convicted of killing another man on a separate occasion. The death
sentence was upheld.183
Several possible explanations help to frame Nieves' punishment. What
strikes me is that this case is not so much about its particular facts, but more
about Nieves having killed on another occasion. If we assume arguendo
that Cuevas as a homeless person has less life value than someone who
is gainfully employed and then murdered, we are not entirely at the
point of grasping this case. Valuing heterosexual victims' lives more than
homosexual victims' lives does not explain what prompted the sentence,
either, here. Nieves' victim's life could have been similarly undervalued.
Both defendant and victim match one another in race and in undesirable
traits, such as itinerancy, drug use, and criminal backgrounds. Nieves,
therefore, seems to be a case about retribution for two murders and the
utilitarian elimination of any future homicidal behavior on the defendant's
part, just as the other cases in this category may say something more about
the appropriateness of punishment if a murder is accompanied by another
crime.
2. Life.-If the death sentences involved cases where defendants were
perceived to be seriously violent and dangerous, the life sentence cases
only serve to muddle any potential understanding of the relationship of
the severity of violence to sentencing. This set of cases involves same-sex
relationships that have soured, gay bashing, secret affairs with homosexual
partners, and in one case, a stepson taking the life of his terminally ill
father. Of these nine cases, at least three had hate-related motives or
features. In two of the nine cases, the defendant was also HIV-positive,
and in four of the cases, the defendant was homosexual. In six of the cases,
the victims were homosexual. The vast majority of the defendants were
minorities (n=7, six black, one Hispanic) and the victims were largely
black, too (at least five of them, with a sixth victim of unknown minority
race). Along their contours, these cases represent crimes committed against
homosexual, minority, and HIV-positive men-four of them by black men
against black men, two by black men against white men, two of white men
against minority men, and one of a Hispanic man against a white man.
State v. Knightf presents a striking example of the life sentence cases.
Knight involved what is best described as a hate crime or "race and gay
bashing." ' The victim Stoner was black, homosexual, and HIV-positive,
and the defendant was white, straight, and HIV-negative. The defendant
and victim met after Stoner walked past a party that Knight was attending
in Winston-Salem." 6 At first, partygoers and Stoner exchanged heated
words, but eventually, Stoner was invited inside the house where the
283 Id.
284 State v. Knight, 459 S.E.2d 481 (N.C. 1995).
285 Id. at 497.
286 Id. at 485.
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party was being held and had a drink. 87 After he left the party, Knight and
three others followed him in a truck. 88 They convinced Stoner to get in
the car with them and proceeded to a convenience store to buy beer. 89
At some point, an intoxicated Stoner attempted to get out of the car, but
Knight placed his hand on his shoulder.9 0 The men drove to a clearing in a
greenway area near the city, turned off the truck, and forced Stoner out of
the vehicle. 91 After beating him, they proceeded to stab him, with Knight
administering thirteen or fourteen strikes with a knife. 92 Leaving Stoner
on the ground, the men decided to return to the party, making a pact never
to tell anyone about the murder. 93
After about an hour at the party, Knight asked another man for a ride to
his house, where he retrieved an eleven-inch hunting knife. 94 He wanted
to return to the greenway to ensure that Stoner was dead. 95 The driver, later
a witness in the case, circled the park and Knight returned to the victim.
z96
The driver testified that Knight had returned to the car and stated that
Stoner had been alive, begging for help, but Knight responded by kicking
him in the head and sticking the knife in the victim's neck and twisting it,
a "trick his father had learned in Vietnam." '97 Knight told Stoner, "Fuck
you, nigger 98 You don't deserve help." ' Then he slashed open Stoner's
rib cage and castrated him, shoving his penis in his mouth.300
After the crime, Knight told the driver-witness that he did not feel
anything and that he "wanted to go back and kill another one the next
night."3 The two men returned to the party. Later that night, the driver
reported the crime to the police.3 2
An autopsy revealed that Stoner had been stabbed more than twenty-
seven times and that several of his wounds would have been fatal
287 Id. at 486.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 486-87.
298 I have only included this word because it was what the defendant said and it provides
some insight into the defendant's thoughts.
299 Knight, 459 S.E.2d at 487.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
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individually.3 3 One knife wound extended from the skull into the brain
stem.3" The coroner further testified that Stoner's heart was still beating at
the time that he received this trauma to the head.0 5 Stoner also had a very
large wound in his chest, approximately seven inches by three inches, and
his rib cage had been split open, exposing his heart and right lung.3° Stoner
was most likely alive when he received this wound. Smaller wounds in his
body leaked blood slowly, and death from these wounds could have taken
more than an hour.
30 7
The defendant, through the mother of his children and his friends,
introduced evidence of his alcoholism and argued that he could have not
been aware of his actions that night.30 ' The court sentenced Knight to
life. 3 9
On appeal, Knight challenged what he perceived as a lack of opportunity
to ascertain through voir dire how prospective members of the trial court's
jury would have felt about the victim's homosexuality and HIV status.310
The state had originally made a motion to have those facts excluded at
trial, which the court refused to address in a ruling.311 The trial court ruled
that questions about homosexuality were relevant to assist in identifying
jurors who might be sympathetic to "gay bashing," but questions relating
to HIV should not be part of jury selection. 32 HIV did not arise as an issue
during voir dire and "little evidence" appeared at trial. 3 3 The appellate
court decided that the possibility of juror prejudice based on the victim's
HIV status did not amount to "fundamental unfairness" in the case.
314
At first glance, perhaps the sentence in Knight reflects a system willing
to accept the powerful influence of alcohol in shaping criminal behavior.
But the situation is more complicated than that. Hate and bias tensions run
through the case. Knight's statement about wanting to kill "another one"
confuses the reader.3"5 Does he mean a black person, a man, a homosexual,
an itinerant person, or just any other person? The victim is black, gay, and
living on the street. His various identities are difficult to untangle from
one another as we try to figure out Knight's motivations and his sources
303 Id. at 485.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 498.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 497.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 498.
315 Id. at 487.
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of hatred. Perhaps one of them alone was enough; perhaps they all were.
The court did not allow Knight to go free, but the sentence strikes me as
mild in light of the threats and hatred that fueled Knight that evening.316
Knight's risk to society may be limited by a lifetime of incarceration, but
the sentence seems relatively weak in deterring others from acting on their
biases. Principles of desert were not served in this case unless one accepts
that the lives of minority victims are somehow less valued in this criminal
system than those of white, heterosexual victims.
As a whole, Knight and the other cases in my study seem to reveal a
system struggling with relating to both the defendant and the victim for
various reasons-race, sexual orientation, poverty, and HIV status. Courts
frame the disputes in these cases largely as private ones, fueled by passion,
bigotry, family dynamics, or adultery. In searching for a thread that links
them, I see another potential explanation. For the most part, these cases
involve "bad blood"3 7 between the parties, brought on through brief
interactions or developed over time. The courts could be reacting to a sense
that the problems guiding the defendants have been resolved through the
victims' deaths, but that still is not a satisfactory explanation for Knight, for
example. Given the clustering of life sentences in cases involving HIV-
positive victims, I would posit that there might be additional barriers to the
courts seeing the taking of these lives as death sentence-worthy. I cannot
hope to unravel the psyches of judges or juries, but I offer some potential
theoretical grounds for further exploration infra Part IV.
3. A Matter of Years.-In the four cases of HIV-positive victims with the
least amount of punishment for the defendants, three involved murder
alone, and the fourth involved murder and robbery. The defendants were
not HIV-positive, nor homosexual. One of the victims was potentially
homosexual, but the facts of the case were ambiguous as to that point.
The defendants were white in two cases and black and Native American
in the remaining cases. Two victims were white and two were of minority
backgrounds. Three of the cases involved preexisting relationships where
the defendant claimed that the HIV-positive victim was a threat. Of those
cases, two involved heterosexual romantic relationships-one a woman
killing her cheating husband, the other a male lover arguing provocation
for killing his female lover because he found out that the lover and her
husband were HIV-positive. The other two cases involved a manslaughter
argument pertaining to the threatening nature of the victim's HIV status,
316 Id. at 498.
317 While the origins of "bad blood" date back to times of bloodfeuds, here, I also recognize
the nature of HIV and its connection to concerns about our public blood supply. See BadBlood:
A Cautionary Tale (Necessary Films 2oo) (a documentary directed by Marilyn Ness).
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and the killing of an AIDS patient over concerns that he would report
previously stolen medication to the authorities.
I have already addressed this thread of the private resolution of
domestic disputes and romantic relationships; that theme is as strong here
as in other situations involving intimate conflict, as evidenced by the doling
out of shorter sentences. The most perplexing case from this subset of
HIV-positive victims cases, however, is State v. Cook and does not involve
intimates at all. 318 The facts are the most troubling to me of these victims'
cases and the court only sentenced the defendant for fifteen years to life.
319
Both the victim and the defendant were white. The defendant was straight,
while the victim's sexual orientation was uncertain. The murder arose
after defendant Cook's common law wife stole painkiller medication from
the victim, Duty, while he was unable to leave his hospital bed at home.
Fearing that Duty would turn them into the police, Cook shot him twice in
bed and then attempted to dispose of the body in a way that would prevent
later identification. He mutilated the corpse by removing teeth and cutting
tattoos from Duty's skin. Cook then dumped the body in a river outside
Topeka, Kansas, where authorities later discovered it.
While the court referred to Duty as a "defenseless AIDS patient," it did
not subject Cook to the death penalty and it overturned an earlier sentence
of forty years without the possibility of parole on the basis that the murder
was not especially heinous or cruel.3"' In examining Kansas law, the court
determined that deaths caused by shooting are not "heinous, atrocious,
or cruel."3 The court then remanded the case for resentencing with the
recommendation of fifteen years before the possibility of parole.3 2
This case could be an anomaly guided by a technicality, but I suggest
that it is worth exploring further. Did the court consider that Duty was
on death's bed? And how did the value of his life, as one that may have
been coming to a close, figure into viewing the harshness of Cook's actions?
I am struck by how gruesome the facts are in this opinion, yet Kansas'
interpretation of what constitutes cruelty is overly simplified as to not reach
this crime. Provided with the opportunity to sentence Cook to life without
parole or death, the appellate court might have still opted for the same
sentence as it did here. In isolation, it is difficult to tell how much the value
of Duty's life as a person living with HIV/AIDS figured into the calculation
of Cook's sentence. Perhaps State v. Cook represents a situation where the
victim's HIV status served to mitigate the defendant's culpability and
punishment.
3i8 State v. Cook, 913 P.2d 97 (Kan. 1996), aff'd, 135 P.3d 1147 (Kan. 2oo6).
319 Id.
320 Id. at i 18-19.
321 Id. at 18.
322 Id. at 19.
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Cook's punishment seems to defy most applications of theories of
punishment. He murdered someone who could not defend himself and
mutilated the body, all in an effort to avoid detection for being involved
in stealing medication. His actions are well outside the bounds of social
and legal rules, and in my mind, he seems to not be an easy candidate for
rehabilitation. The trial judge suggested that a sentence of fifteen years
may have been appropriate.31 3 A matter of fifteen years does little to honor
desert, deterrence, or incapacitation desires.
D. When Victim and Villain Meet
Two cases among the thirty-six in the study involve both an HIV-
positive defendant and victim; in both of these cases, the defendants and
victims are homosexual. Both of those cases resulted in life sentences. In
State v. Coney, an incarcerated prisoner who was serving a 420-year sentence
for child rape set his inmate lover on fire.3 4 The victim Southworth had
spurned him by becoming involved with another inmate. Coney tried to
discredit Southworth's dying declaration that Coney had set him on fire
by claiming that his attorney should have offered evidence at the trial of
Southworth's HIV-positive status and his belief that Coney had given it to
him. The response of the trial court was that it "may be good fiction, but it
has no relevance to the facts of this case. Here, the victim was dying because
he was being burned alive, not because he was dying from AIDS."3 5
The sentence in Coney proves to be a difficult one for explanation.
He acted on vengeance and had a history of abusing the most vulnerable
members of society-children-and yet the court gave him a life sentence.
Constructively, his life sentence may just be another way of keeping him
behind bars until he dies. But keeping him incarcerated for the years to
come proves to be confusing in some respects. He has taken a life while
incarcerated. In many ways, the prison cannot contain his cunning and
deviant behavior; he has made guards complicit in giving him the materials
for arson and murder. He is among the most dangerous of people in a very
dangerous place.
In United States v. Lightfoot,3" 6 the defendant paid to have his HIV-
positive girlfriend murdered.3"7 His girlfriend was a transsexual man and a
witness in a case involving bank robbery charges against Lightfoot.3"8 The
defendant was not allowed to testify about his own HIV-positive status. In
the course of the case, Lightfoot claimed that his HIV status is what had
323 Id. at 114.
324 State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 124 (Fla. 2003).
325 Id. at 136.
326 United States v. Lightfoot, 483 F3 d 876 (8th Cir. 2007).
327 See id. at 878, 884..
328 Id. at 887, n.2.
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motivated the robberies 3 9 because he was compelled by a desire to garner
money before the illness left him incapacitated. 330 The court would only
allow Lightfoot to testify that he had an unspecified health condition which
put "pressure" on him financially.331 Lightfoot received a life sentence.
Lightfoot presents its own complexities. One might expect the court
to punish severely a person willing to have a federal witness against him
murdered. He enlisted assistance in the murder, perhaps making his own
hands cleaner in some ways to the court. The court seemed to struggle,
however, with what to allow into the trial about HIV, limiting Lightfoot's
ability to present his actual diagnosis. There is no explanation in the opinion
for why this is so and I am left to conjecture about what HIV may have
done to the sentencing process. Could the court have been concerned that
HIV would have resulted in an even lighter sentence? Or was the court's
concern the opposite in that it assumed that HIV may have made Lightfoot
an easier defendant to put to death-a perceived charitable hastening of an
already present death sentence?
An alternative explanation that I offer for both cases is that I am missing
a piece of critical information about the health status of the defendants.
Their HIV/AIDS may have progressed to the point where more severe
sentencing was pointless because their deaths were inevitable or state
resources could be conserved by limiting capital-related appeals.
I note, though, that these defendants and victims are both potentially
distancing to the courts, which may have resulted in a cancellation effect
of some kind when it came to the consideration of the death penalty. It
is possible that neither victim evoked compassion; one is transsexual and
the other a prisoner, both are homosexual and have HIV. The defendants
are equally distancing in their propensities for criminal violence, their HIV
status, and their homosexuality. They were presented as dangerous, but
their victims were not painted in the most favorable light, either.
Judges and juries might be interested in providing care for the
defendants as they live with the disease or they might simply have struggled
with how to assess the gravity of these murders, given how different the
defendants' and victims' experiences were from their own lives. If HIV-
negative and heterosexual lives are valued within society and are the norms,
circumstances involving HIV-positive lives or homosexuality challenge
decision-makers' sense of familiarity and comfort.3s2 It is precisely this
329 Id. at 884.
330 See id.
331 See id. at 884.
332 See, e.g., Kevin McGruder, Pathologizing Black Sexuality: The United States Experience, in
BLACK SEXUALITIES: PROBING POWERS, PASSIONS, PRACTICES, AND POLICIES 101, 113 (Juan
Battle & Sandra L. Barnes eds., 201O) (discussing the privileging of heterosexuality and HIV-
negative status in the black community); CATHERINE WALDBY, AIDS AND THE BODY POLITIC:
BIOMEDICINE AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 13 (1996) (extending this argument to encompass
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question of how difference and distance affect sentencing outcomes that
has guided many of the inquiries into discrimination in the criminal justice
system, particularly in matters such as race.
333
IV. PUNISHING DISABILITY?
Part of the punishment of HIV seems to reflect the privileging
and punishing of certain disabilities over others. Scholar Melissa Cole
has described a "hierarchy of disability" in which different kinds of
impairments and limitations are marked as more disabling or less desirable
than others.334 Given the extensive literature on HIV stigma in the social
sciences and the history of public response to the epidemic, as described
in Part I, my argument that HIV itself holds a low status, if not the lowest
status position among disabilities, is not a leap of logic.
335
But social punishment is indeed different from criminal punishment,
though criminal punishment both acts as a form of social punishment and
embodies social attitudes and norms. 336 The cases presented in Part III offer
two interrelated approaches to the punishment of disability: procedure and
status. In this Part of the article, I suggest potential explanations of the
function or dysfunction of the HIV disability in the criminal justice system
and additional theoretical approaches for understanding the trends and the
cases themselves.
337
heterosexuality, masculinity, and HIV-negative status).
333 See Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth
Amendment Argumentfor Abolition Based on Unconscious RacialDiscrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2o83, 2o85-86 (2004).
334 Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton Court's Closeting of Disabilities, 43
How. L.J. 499, 515 (2000) (elaborating that this hierarchy creates schisms in the disability
community, making organizing around disability as a socio-political experience even more
difficult); see also Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE
PUBLIC 297, 297 (Scott Burris, et al. eds., 1993) (describing HIV as having two epidemics-one
of the disease itself and another of fear).
335 See John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2009)
(arguing that the realities of the physical effects of HIV in prison are not to be overlooked
because HIV is a disease that complicates adaptation to prison life, making the experience of
punishment different from someone who does not have the disease).
336 See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALI. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) (arguing that
utilitarianism, however, focuses on the positive individual and social consequences that
punishment offers).
337 See Lynn S. Branham, AIDS Before the Bench: The ABA Guidelines Can Help You, 29 JUDGES
J., Spring 199o, at 47, 50 (presenting ABA guidelines recommending full voir dire on the issue
of the HIV-positive status of the defendant as to avoid stigma in the courtroom).
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A. HIV Disability as a Procedural Impediment
By procedurally punishing disability, I am referring to the mechanisms by
which disability as a generic category can result in barriers in the procedural
administration of justice.338 To understand some of these barriers, we will
also have to consider the substantive issue of what disability status is in
this particular situation and how it affects just punishment.339 For now, let
us work under the assumption that the case studies presented are no more
egregious than a typical random sample of murder cases, if that could be
ordained, or that one of the largest facts that sets them apart is the presence
of disability in the sentencing process.4
Procedurally speaking, disability could be treated as a mitigating
factor.3" While none of the courts in the thirty-six cases studied for this
article recognized HIV as causing a physical or mental anomaly that
spurred the murder or made the murder itself less egregious, sentencing
does not merely work to look at the facts of the crime itself. It also takes
into consideration personal characteristics of victims34 and defendants.
Desert might be affected by the difficult life of an HIV-defendant;
perhaps some courts perceive that the defendant knows suffering to
a greater extent than others not living with the disease. Issues of mercy
may be implicated, as well, if society is interested in extending kindness
and compassion to people living with serious illnesses. Consequentialists,
too, might be interested in HIV as a mitigator in that there may be better
ways of providing for defendants with HIV than rendering unusually harsh
sentences. Status issues such as drug addiction, family abuse,
343 cancer, 344
polio,3 45 pregnancy,346 and joint conditions3 47 have been recognized as valid
bases for mitigating criminal sentences for defendants. In fact, according to
338 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB.
L. 476,484-85 (2000).
339 Contra Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
76 HARv. L. REV. 441,455 (1963) (emphasizing the role of procedural regularity in the criminal
courts rather than substantive justice).
340 See Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35
(2OOl) ("Procedural justice in the United States demands disinterestedness and never love.").
341 See discussion supra Part I.C. and 111.D.
342 On retributive grounds, the law might seek to punish defendants preying on vulnerable
victims, such as HIV-positive people, by extending harsher punishment to those kinds of
crimes.
343 See Canaan v. McBride, 395 F3d 376, 386-87 (7th Cir. zoo5) (holding that failure to
present evidence of defendant's history of family abuse and drug addiction was ineffective
assistance of counsel).
344 United States v. Velasquez, 762 E Supp. 39,40 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
345 United States v. McClean, 822 F. Supp. 961, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
346 United States v. Denoncourt, 751 E Supp. 168, 17o-71 (D.Haw. 19go).
347 United States v. Boy, No. 93 - 3ooo, 19 94 WL 59781, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1994).
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principles of due process, a sentencer cannot be precluded from considering
any mitigating circumstances in death penalty cases.-" These mitigating
factors do not need to be causally related to the crime, rather, they are
presented to provide compassion and to recognize the "diverse frailties of
humankind."3 49
Further, some state sentencing guidelines as well as the American Law
Institute (ALl) in its Model Penal Code Commentary have considered
health status as a potential mitigator or trigger for deviation from "standard"
sentencing.3 0 In 1999, the ALl initiated a project to revisit the sentencing
provisions in the Model Penal Code "in light of the many changes in
sentencing philosophy and practice that have taken place in the more than
40 years since the Code was first developed. '3.. In the ALI's discussion
of revisions to the Model Penal Code and the subsequent drafts, there
are several compelling openings for treating HIV as a mitigating factor or
grounds for a downward departure. These grounds are linked to achieving
punishment goals and providing humane incarceration options. A sentence
may be reduced, for example, when it does not meet the retributive or
utilitarian purposes of criminal law.3"' Personal characteristics of the
defendant may be considered in sentencing "when indicative of hardship,
deprivation, vulnerability, or handicap, but only as grounds to reduce the
severity of sentences."
' 35 3
ALI's 2007 revisions relevant to this project have taken the form of
three drafts focused on reforms in sentencing commissions, sentencing
guidelines, and the courts' role in sentencing.354 The drafters of the 2007
sentencing provisions were concerned about a growing prison population.
The 2009 draft (Draft 2) considered the need to provide health care or
intervention for physically ill inmates in the system. 35 Perhaps most
notably, in 2009, the ALl Council voted to eliminate the MPC's capital
punishment provisions.
35 6
Section 6B.06 of the 2007 Draft and 6B.09 of Draft 3 (2010) are of
the most import to this article. Section 6B.06 allows for "the personal
characteristics of offenders" to "be included as considerations within the
348 Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
349 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
350 See, e.g.,TENN. CODE ANN. §39--13-204(C) (20 io) (allowing evidence of "physical condition"
to be introduced as a mitigating factor); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-zo7(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2oo8)
(allowing evidence of "physical condition" to be introduced as a mitigating factor).
351 ALl, Current Projects: Model Penal Code: Sentencing, http://www.ali.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj-ip&projectid=2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
352 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. I 2007).
353 Id. at § 6B.o6(4)(a).
354 Current Projects: Model Penal Code: Sentencing, supra note 35 1.
355 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
356 Current Projects: Model Penal Code: Sentencing, supra note 351.
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guidelines when indicative of circumstances of hardship, deprivation,
vulnerability, or handicap, but only as grounds to reduce the severity of
sentences that would otherwise be recommended."
In 2010, the drafters attempted to revisit some of the 2007 discussion and
respond to the need to provide appropriate sentences given incarceration
conditions. The Draft's discussion focused on abolishing the death penalty
and also reconsidering the appropriateness of life without parole.35 7 The
drafters' reluctance to recommend unqualified natural life sentences
revolved around several key issues, two of which are relevant to this article:
the failure of sentencing regimes to account for prisoners' health changes
over time and the inability of the prison system to respond to the needs of
inmates with fatal diseases.35
Draft 3 proves extremely relevant to my study in its suggestions
regarding the appropriateness of sentencing modifications based on
physical or mental "infirmity. '35 9 Section 6B.09 is of particular interest
because it could potentially affect the outcome of cases involving HIV-
positive defendants. It renews the Commission's focus on rehabilitation by
directing it to "develop, and update as necessary, instruments or processes,
based on the best available research, to assess the needs of offenders for
rehabilitative treatment, and to assist the courts in judging the amenability
of individual offenders to specific rehabilitative programs in confinement
or in the community." This set of provisions allows sentencing commissions
to consider the risk posed to society by a particular defendant and set
sentences outside mandatory minimums. While the defendants in my
set of cases have been convicted of murder, their health trajectories over
time may reduce the risk they pose to society or demand more therapeutic
correctional settings.
Mechanisms exist, therefore, to allow for deviations from normal
sentencing. In this article's study, the cases demonstrate harsh outcomes
beyond the range of what one might expect to see in an "average" murder
case and seem to indicate either procedural issues and disparities in the
system or sampling problems. Certainly, there is no definition of an average
murder case or a typical murder. Simple comparisons between this study's
core group of HIV-positive offenders and the general murder sentencing
statistics are admittedly rudimentary, but they are not presented for
empirical purposes.3 6° These comparisons do suggest a way, however, to
357 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.o9 (Discussion Draft No. 3, 2010). [hereinafter
MPC Draft 3].
358 MPC Draft 3, § 6B.o9.
359 MPC Draft 3, §305.7.
360 Cf Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on
Capital Punishment, 4 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (zoo6) (highlighting the problems of empirical
approaches in the study of capital punishment cases by focusing on erroneous theoretical
conclusions surrounding deterrence and the death penalty).
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advance the argument that awareness of the role of HIV in the sentencing
process would be valuable. Thus, if only one-percent of felony cases result
in life sentences and the average murder sentence is about 250 months, 6'
it seems anomalous and perhaps worrisome that in the thirty-six cases
presented in my study, fifteen resulted in life sentences (two of them in
jurisdictions where life was the maximum penalty) and another fifteen
in death sentences. That is approximately forty-two percent of the cases
going for life or death respectively.
Beyond the issue of a small dataset with potential selection bias, there
are several potential explanations for why, procedurally, this group's set of
punishments may be at the maximum, or to some minds, seem harsh. The
first potential factor, as mentioned, is the facts of the particular crime-
its extreme violence or disregard for human life, for example.36 Murders
accompanied by other crimes, such as those for financial gain or sex crimes,
are punished more severely by our criminal justice system.3 63 In this article's
study, nineteen cases fell into this category. Similarly, crimes involving
more than one victim could demand a greater level of punishment.364 Here,
eight cases fell into that pattern and they were equally divided between
life and death sentences.
Another potential factor to distinguish these cases from the "average"
murder case and sentence would be the criminal history of the defendant,
including his or her history of violent crime or repeat offender status.3 65 In
this article's cases, however, the criminal backgrounds of the defendants
reveal something not terribly outside the range of other offenders. Most of
the defendants appeared to have some criminal history, ranging from drug
offenses to violent crimes. Some of the defendants had no criminal history
at all and had been motivated to murder based on a personal relationship
that went awry.
One trait that the defendants do share, beyond having been accused of
murder, is minority racial status; twenty-five of the thirty-six cases involve
minority defendants. National studies of murder defendants and victims
have shown that approximately fifty-percent of murder defendants are
black and that most murders are within racial groups, with black people
being six times more likely to be homicide victims than whites.3 66 Only
361 SEAN ROSENMERKEL, ET AL., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006, STATISTICAL
TABLES, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssco6st.pdf.
362 Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court's Capital
Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1 t89-92 (2003).
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only BadActs Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV.
SI O9 (2oo8).
366 JAMES ALAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWiTZ, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES:
2002 UPDATE 2 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htuso2.pdf; John
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eight of the cases studied for this article involve victims who are not also
minorities; one of these cases has two victims-one a minority and the
other white. Out of all thirty-six cases, eighteen victims are minorities and
an additional two are of unknown race.
This set of cases includes a substantial number of minority defendants
and a fairly equal divide between minority victims and white victims, but
the sentences themselves, relative to race, offer additional perspectives.
Eight of the fifteen death penalty sentences are in cases involving white
victims; of these cases, three of the defendants were minorities. These are
largely cases, therefore, of death sentences involving both white defendants
and white victims. However, only sixteen of the thirty-six cases involve
white victims at all, making death the punishment in half of all cases with
white victims.
It is uncertain what the numbers from these cases mean, but they might
reflect other patterns that scholars have observed. Studies examining the
effects of race on criminal sentencing abound.367 Jurors are more likely to
recommend capital punishment in cases involving white victims.36 They
also assess defendants in terms of how much they are like themselves.369
This kind of approach to justice poses a problem in a system where racial
representation on juries has not been achieved with any uniformity.
30
While six defendants (and a potential seventh) and eleven victims (with
a potential twelfth) in the cases analyzed for this article were homosexual,
no study, to my knowledge, examines the effect of the defendant's
sexual orientation on murder sentencing. It would be difficult to assess.
In contrast, the law anticipates that victims may be targeted because of
sexual orientation and provides procedural compensation mechanisms
such as hate crime statutes and aggravated sentencing for vulnerable
populations. 371 Like race, sexual orientation can be a source of stigma in
Blume, et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. I65, 166-67 (2004).
367 See e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING LEGACY (20 io), available at http://eji.org/eji/files/Race and Jury Selection Report.
pdf (reporting the continuing problem of equal access of black people to juries); SAMUEL
R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING 66-69 (1989) (using multiple regression analysis and controlling for high and
low aggravation to show correlation between sentencing and the race of victims); David C.
Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An
Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-199o Research, 41 CRIM. L.
BULL. art. I I (2005) (finding that murder cases involving white victims were more likely to
result in capital punishment).
368 See supra note 271.
369 See Id.
370 See William W. Barry, III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition of
theDeath Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889,900-03 (2010) (implying that juries are overwhelmingly
white, and arguing that juries therefore identify with white victims).
371 Lu-in Wang, Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 8o B.U. L. REV. 1399, 1401-05 (2000).
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the courts and the system anticipates that hurdle for victims, yet there
has been no systematic study of the relational barrier presented by sexual
orientation for defendants.37
A multitude of additional factors can affect sentencing, such as the judge
or jury's temperament and background, jurisdiction, and access to effective
representation."' Therefore, it is not surprising that an attempt to break
apart a case and a process into its respective segments, lines of influence,
and potential outcomes could be a harrowing, and misplaced, exercise.
Indeed, these cases are complicated by the fact that they are from different
jurisdictions and represent a small number of defendants and victims
flagged as HIV-positive through the limited search capabilities of Westlaw
and Lexis Nexis. The process of analysis is, in some ways, frustrated by
the limited discussion of health status in criminal cases. Many of these
cases are from hotspots of HIV/AIDS viral activity and may present more
of a slice of local demographics embedded in an already atrocious crime,
although the courts do not address these dynamics.
37 4
B. Disability as Status and Crime
If the procedural influences are difficult to draw definitively, perhaps
the question becomes one of what HIV means substantively as a form
of status. What does HIV mean in society and represent in a case and its
process? I am focusing on how definitions of "categories" of people may
define the cases themselves. The cases, in fact, seem substantively unjust
from some perspectives because people living with a chronic and terminal
illness are being put to death. Even those defendants with life sentences
may face earlier deaths than the average inmate because of lack of access
to adequate health interventions. From other perspectives, these cases may
be regarded as procedurally just because the courts are punishing murder
with indifference to health status. Or there may be a concern that by not
372 Prejudice based on sexual orientation can be a factor considered in at least one state's
courts in assessing trial fairness, however. SeeTimothy V. Kau fman-Osborn, CapitalPunishment,
Proportionality Review, and Claims of Fairness (with Lessons from Washington State), 79 WAsH. L.
REv. 775, 81o, app. A (2004) (providing a judicial questionnaire about a case and any potential
bias posed by such factors as race, gender, and sexual orientation).
373 Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 337, 339-40 (2000)
(attributing information overload to the development of heuristic "shortcuts" that may
influence the decision-making process); Kenneth Miller & David Niven, Mixed Messages: The
Supreme Court's Conflicting Decisions on Juries in Death Penalty Cases, CRIM. L. BRIEF Spring 2010,
at 69, 74 (noting that personal biases affect juries' applications of mitigating factors); Richard
L. Wiener, Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges and Juries Reach Penalty Decisions?
8I NEB. L. REV. 757 (2002) (examining the cognitive psychology behind death penalty
determinations in Nebraska).
374 Nat'l Minority Quality Forum, U.S. H1VIAIDS Index, MAPHIV.oRG, http://www.maphiv.
org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
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punishing swiftly and severely, the spread of HIV by this person or the
continuation of the criminal activities is likely.
But I contend that the more interesting question is what HIV is in these
cases, what it represents. At first glance, HIV is a disability, but I offer that
HIV can come to mean more than a physical or mental impairment. HIV
can also easily become a proxy for race, gender, and sexual orientation in
ways that bring along the perceived "social disabilities" and stereotypes of
those categories, too. For example, the black man living with HIV might
be perceived as deserving his condition because a court assumes it came
from IV-drug use or homosexual prostitution. Similarly, the HIV-positive
victim who was murdered by the heterosexual, HIV-negative defendant
can come to be perceived as the real threat if there were any intimations
of sexual interest or defensiveness on his or her part. Even HIV alone,
as a category, is stigmatized within the hierarchy of traditional disability
categories (e.g., mobility impairments, sensory impairments, mental illness,
cognitive impairments) as the morally laden, unsympathetic disability,
ultimately distancing of judges and juries from the victims and defendants
in these cases.
1. HIV as a Proxy for Race Status.-As noted earlier in this article, the
defendants in these murder cases are largely racial minorities. Scholars
working on race issues outside of the HIV context have made significant
contributions to American jurisprudence by questioning the interplay of
socioeconomic status and legal outcomes and pointing to the political and
hierarchical nature of law itself.375 Arguably, people living with HIV, and the
defendants in these cases, do not often have much power within the legal
system because of both their HIV status and their race. Furthermore, if the
narrative of HIV is one of a failure of personal responsibility in preventing
the contraction and transmission of HIV, then that narrative may carry over
into how we, as a society, make people living with HIV responsible for
other actions unrelated to their disease. This perspective might help to
explain the general lack of empathy for HIV-positive minority victims in
these cases.
Scholars such as Dekera Greene and James Forman, Jr. have challenged
the account of personal responsibility for HIV by suggesting that other
factors may be at play in the epidemic-population density, poor access
to health services, and class and racial gentrification that tend to exclude
those people living at the margins.37 6 As Forman suggests, legal theorists
need to consider race in trying to craft theories about how communities
respond to social problems. Even the notion of "linked fates"-supposing
that marginalized groups are cohesive in responding to problems affecting
375 See generally Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94
YALE L.J. 461 (1984) (compiling a cross section of important Critical Legal Studies literature).
376 Dekera Greene, Ain't No Peace Until We Get a Piece, THE MODERN AM., Spring 2009, at 3,
4n. 12.
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their members-may erode in the face of crime or in public health crises
such as HIV.377 Forman has built on Cathy Cohen's work regarding the black
community's response to HIV as a "cross-cutting" rather than a "consensus"
issue, asserting that HIV has the power to divide the community rather
than bring it together.378 Those divides tend to create clusters of people
who are similarly marginalized and disenfranchised.37 9 Therefore, if we are
dealing with a largely diverse population of defendants facing HIV stigma,
it is not surprising that they may not find a source of support within their
own racial communities to confront and address potential HIV stigma in
the justice system.
Richard Delgado has suggested that a rearrangement of systems of
power and the daily institutions of living that will result in greater justice
for minorities.380 Complicating the push for greater justice for HIV-positive
defendants in these cases, however, is the relative weight of each identity
in producing stigma. Kimberl6 Crenshaw has warned that a focus on one
perceived aspect of identity may obscure the actual experience of identity.
38 1
Advancing a theory of "intersectionality," Crenshaw has explored the ways
in which multiple identities-race, sexual orientation, and gender, among
them-may interact to create both marginalization and meaning within
society.382 People labeled as different or diverse are not passive instruments
in this process. They create identities and explanations of their own,
enriching and complicating our understandings of discrimination and bias
in societal institutions3 83 such as the criminal courts.
When the courts in the cases featured in this article explored drug
use, other "risky behavior," and poverty in the context of HIV-positive
minority defendants, for example, their discussions suggested that race is
wrapped up with other forms of identity and status that can marginalize
and segregate defendants. Efforts to assess and counteract bias must focus
377 James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America's Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L.
REv. 791, 795-98 (201 I) (emphasizing the tension between wanting crime control in black
neighborhoods and worrying about how policies and punishments might ultimately affect
citizens of those neighborhoods).
378 CATHY J. COHEN, THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF BLACK
POLITICS 8-9 (1999).
379 Id.
380 Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 320-21 (1987); see also Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American LegalScholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1266-68 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of rights-based solutions for
minorities, as well as the need for theorists to deepen their understandings of racial dynamics
beyond a binary system of black and white).
381 See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1258 (199I).
382 Id. at 1296-99.
383 Id.
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on both the context of individual identities (victims, defendants, judges,
juries) and an almost archaeological mining of institutions themselves. It
is not enough to say that race, sexual orientation, or HIV status are empty
categories or that they are rich ones, replete with bias. Rather, any project
must consider the ways in which HIV and other forms of status and identity
interact with and influence the court system. If courts refuse to discuss race
or HIV directly, they hamper this endeavor of making stigma transparent.
2. HIV as a Proxy for Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation.-As I explored
earlier in this article when discussing HIV stigma, "gayness" and HIV are
often paired in the social imagination. Part of the reason why HIV has
long been perceived by some communities as deserved is because of the
accompanying belief that it is a gay disease. Of course, straight men can
also acquire the disease, but there is an underlying attitude that straight
people get HIV from having deviant sexual intercourse-such as men who
have sex with men. In this way, these men are not behaving in traditionally
masculine ways and are perceived as deserving of some of the questioning
and stigma that may come from their outlying behaviors. Sexual orientation
and gender identity, unlike race, do occupy the text of these cases and
there seems to be far more speculation about the sexual proclivities and
identities of both defendants and victims than discussions of their racial
status. These are murder cases, yet discussions of sex abound as courts sort
through fact situations involving otherwise "straight-acting" men behaving
vulnerably and "unmanly" by having sex with gay men, transgendered
witnesses being murdered, and straight men fearing that their wives would
learn about their affairs with men.
What is so interesting about the issue of sexual orientation and gender
identity is that it offers a potential theoretical bridge between race and
disability by challenging the stability of such constructed social categories
as gay/straight, black/white, and healthy/"handicapped. 3 4 Opinions where
the defendants or victims have not assimilated but have acted in ways
outside the comfort zones of judges and juries seem to result in a range of
penalties, from the cancellation effect that I discussed in cases where both
the defendant and victim are HIV-positive and homosexual men, to more
life sentences in general among the cases involving homosexual defendants
and victims. Heterosexual men are, perhaps, easier for judges and juries to
relate to, but they tend to receive death sentences in these cases. They
get punished "as real men" would. Cases involving heterosexual victims
dominate the death sentence cases studied in this article, too.
If we step back for a moment and pretend that every HIV-positive
defendant and victim in the cases studies was also homosexual, we see
that these courts are more willing to consider life sentences or less-than-
life sentences in cases where HIV-positive victims died. It may not be
384 See Nicholas Bamforth, Critical Approaches to Sexuality and Law, 24 J.L. & Soc'Y 306, 306
(1997).
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that HIV has its own separate meaning for the courts, but rather that HIV
denotes a certain kind of lifestyle-a gay lifestyle- that is far outside of the
experience of most judges and juries.38 Who are these men who have sex
with men or change their biological sex? They are not us, and in not being
us, perhaps it is easier to see their lives as impoverished and their crimes
as less reprehensible than those committed by "dangerous" HIV-positive
heterosexual defendants or against HIV-negative heterosexual victims.
38 6
Sexual orientation, or even a failure to perform in a recognized,
traditionally male capacity as a defendant or a victim, may result in a social
disability that in turn clouds sentencing. For example, in considering the
cases involving male intimate relationships that ended in murder, we see
that sexual orientation and gender identity may produce strange mitigating
effects within the system.The ineluctable barrier then is assisting judges and
juries with thinking outside their own sexual comfort zones and removing
psych o--cognitive barriers to pathos, when deserved, for defendants and
victims from minority sexual orientations. 387 Part of the work of courts is
to decide cases in which the participants may not be expert on all matters,
particularly those of identity.388 While it is not possible to determine the
precise role that sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity played in this
set of murder cases, or run the risk of essentializing,38 9 we can examine the
stories within the cases and what they say about disability.
3. HIV as Disability: What Disability Studies Might Offer-When is HIV just
a disability? While disability, as a category, is presented as the final lens
of focus for grasping these cases in a richer way, it has been a prominent
theme in the narratives and my analysis in this article. Disability rears itself
in interesting ways in these cases. It appears in both its traditional form of
a physical or mental impairment 9 as well as in the sociological forms of
385 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX"
(1993) (arguing that heterosexuality shapes what bodies and genders are of significance in
society).
386 Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender,"and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law andSodety, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 23-27,
186-91 (1995).
387 In his article, Valdes quotes Judge Richard Posner's acknowledgment that "judges know
next to nothing about [sex and sexuality] beyond their own personal experience," and "people
with irregular sex lives are pretty much ... screened out of the judiciary." Id. at 7 (quoting
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON I (1992)).
388 Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1753-54 (1996).
389 Janet Halley, Sexual Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80 (Wendy Brown &
Janet Halley eds., 2002).
39 o The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 121o2, defines disability as "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," "a record of
such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12 IO2( i)
(Supp. 2011).
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race, class, sexual orientation, and criminal status as "disabilities" of some
kind.391 From a civil rights perspective, disability as a category is a catch-all
of sorts for conditions of marginalization, stigma, and deviance. Disability
is something not medically indicated but socially produced, and as such, its
effects are pervasive.
Disability studies, 392 an interdisciplinary field examining the social,
cultural, and political nature of disability, adds another layer of analysis to
how society in general and the criminal courts in particular might view
HIV as a disability and punish it as such. Scholars working in the field have
contended that people with disabilities are often individually punished for
the structural deficits in society, whether they be in communities, families,
or government, and that the failure to be "normal" or "accepted" is then
an individual problem or failure. 313 This kind of stigma and oppression
is often referred to as ableism when it relates to physical differences, and
sanism when it relates to mental ones.
394
In the thirty-six cases studied for this article, a defendant's being
disabled by HIV did not make one a more sympathetic character and did not
evoke arguments about mercy. Rather, it showed perhaps dangerousness,
recklessness, or menace. The treatment of HIV in these cases resonates
with the history of disability, where perspectives evolved from the view
that disability was "a sin (a punishment from God forgiven through divine
intervention)" to a "pathology (a physical, sensory, or cognitive failing
that tragically 'handicaps' those afflicted)."3 95 Disability, in general, is a
category overlaid with moral judgments about character, fitness, and worth.
The history of disability is one in which people and their deviant bodies
and minds have been punished as a matter of containing that perceived
deviance.396 "Ugly laws" were common in America in the late nineteenth
391 See, e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, Disabling Racial Repetition, 31 J.L. & INEQUALITY 79, 85 (noting
that race has been a "disabling factor in education and in most other areas of life"); D. Kim
Reid & Michelle G. Knight, Disability Justifies Exclusion of Minority Students: A Critical History
Grounded in Disability Studies, 35 EDuc. RESEARCHER, Aug./Sept. 2oo6, at 18, 18-19 (warning
about the conflation of race and disability). Even with this contribution to make to the
construction of disabilities in society, disability studies, like critical legal theory, has been
critiqued, perhaps rightfully so, as being too "white." See CHRISTOPHER M. BELL, BLACKNESS
AND DISABILITY: CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS AND CULTURAL INTERVENTIONS 3 (Christopher M.
Bell ed., 2011).
392 See generally, Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What's Disability Studies Got to Do With It or An
Introduction to Disability LegalStudies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 402 (2011) (supporting the
omnipresence of disability in legal issues and the need for disability studies as a considered
part of the law schools' curricula).
393 Bradley Lewis, A Mad Fight: Psychiatry andDisabiliy Activism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES
READER 339, 340 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2oo6).
394 Id.
395 DAN GOODLEY, DISABILITY STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 6 (2o 1).
396 Sharon Snyder & David Mitchell, Afterword: Regulated Bodies: Disability Studies and the
Controlling Professions, in SOCIAL HISTORIES OF DISABILITY AND DEFORMITY 175, 181 (David M.
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and early twentieth centuries and kept people with disabilities out of public
sight.397 The eugenics movement and state sterilization of people with
disabilities continued well into the mid-twentieth century.398 People with
different bodies have long posed both a puzzle and a threat to institutions
where normalcy is a key virtue, just as the HIV-positive defendants and
victims in this article's case studies are outsiders to the courts.
What distinguishes HIV from most traditional forms of disability
is society's perception of it as being self-inflicted.399 While the what-
happened-to-you? question may be ever-present in the lives of all disabled
people, many narratives of impairment arouse empathy, especially when
they are related to war service, accidents, or birth defects. 40° The primary
view of HIV has been that it is self-caused; to some people, that can mean
that the disease and its effects-both physical and social-are deserved. 4°1
Therefore, if being an HIV-positive defendant results in relatively harsh
sentencing for a crime such as murder, hardly anyone will have a problem
with this outcome. 4°z Moral judgments about the disease itself become
wrapped up with judgments about the crime. For better or worse, the act of
sentencing is an overall assessment of the person. HIV-positive defendants
may be judged to be "bad" people.4°3 They are punished for their crime
and for their HIV disability.
In the context of the cases studied, victims and defendants with
HIV are both bad, but for different reasons, and are treated accordingly.
Defendants are bad actors not only because they pose a risk to society in
Turner & Kevin Stagg eds., 2oo6).
397 SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 64-66 (2009).
398 A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO THE HUMAN
GENOME ERA, supra note 79 at 1, 2, 4-5.
399 Karolynn Siegel, et al., Stigma Management Among Gay/Bisexual Men with HIVIAIDS, in
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A TEXT-READER IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 263, 263 (Delos H. Kelly
& Edward J. Clarke eds., 6th ed. 2002) (characterizing societal reactions to HIV/AIDS to be
negative due to perceptions that it is a "self-inflicted" disease because of "lifestyle choices"
and the performance of "disapproved behaviors, especially homosexuality, and illicit drug
use").
400 See RICHARD M. GARGIULO, SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO EXCEPTIONALITY 131-32 (2010) (discussing how different cultures perceive
and react to causes of disability).
401 See Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 33, 46 (1990)
(describing the ostracism of people living with HIV and judges' negative reactions to HIV-
positive people). That kind of stigma still exists, in part, today.
402 For a parallel to other kinds of disability-related situations concerning quality of life
judgments, see Martha A. Field, Killing "The Handicapped"-Before and After Birth, I6 HARv.
VOMEN'S L.J. 79, 84-89 (1993) (identifying the problems and biases of substituted decision-
making when it comes to life and death choices for newborns with disabilities).
403 See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil
Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1I 7, 1038 (1989) (using the term "incorrigibles"); McArthur, supra
note 88, at 730 (recognizing the "stigma associated with having the disease").
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their willingness to commit murder, but also because their health status
poses a risk of murder in itself. HIV is associated with secrecy, deviance,
and a disregard for social order; therefore, it is not surprising that judges
and juries, consciously or unconsciously, would want to contain both the
individual and the disease by giving HIV-positive defendants a death
sentence or life imprisonment.' As noted in the case in the Introduction,
the "specter" of HIV/AIDS is omnipresent.
40 5
Jurors and judges bring more to bear on the sentencing process than
their individual values and senses of identity. In being confronted with
the issue of HIV and its accompanying stigma, they might also bring their
norms of identifying with certain social groups.' ° To identify with a social
group means also having to internalize its norms. For example, if a judge or
juror is only able to see himself or herself as part of the "normal," healthy,
or HIV-negative members of society, he or she could end up meting out
harsher punishment for people who are different. These reactions can be
based on perceived values, intergroup stereotypes, and fears about what
these differences mean.
When sentencers are confronted with HIV-positive victims, they tend
to shift focus from containment of the virus and "viral" behavior (e.g.,
violence, aggression, addiction, sexual deviance) to consideration of the
value of the deceased's life. Here, the theme of life-value is not drastically
different. We punish the murder, but we may not have the same worries
about contagion that we do when dealing with an HIV-positive defendant.
Alternatively, the trend of lighter sentencing for these murders may be
explained by the courts' refusal to attribute the same value to the HIV-
positive victim's life as they do to an HIV-negative person's life. Regardless
of the severity of the crime, as demonstrated in the hate-filled murder in
Winston-Salem, °7 courts offer a matter of years or life as the punishment.
Perhaps these lives are more difficult to relate to than HIV-negative ones,
or maybe the behaviors associated with HIV-drug use, sexual wantonness,
and a failure to avoid disease-trigger a "hierarchy of disability" in which
HIV sits at the bottom of all disabilities that might arouse compassion
and empathy."8 Society views people with HIV differently from people
404 For a parallel example on the containment of HIV among sex workers, see Aziza Ahmed,
Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS: Consequences for Women's Health, 34
H~Av. J.L. & GENDER 225, 235 (201i) (describing the stigmatization of "sex-workers-as-
vectors" and the failures of the public health containment approach).
405 See discussion of State v. Hudson, 1989 WL 134703, at *i (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) in the
Introduction.
406 Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REv.
605, 632-37 (2004) (offering a group-based theory of norms).
407 State v. Knight, 459 S.E.zd 481,481-87 (N.C. 1995).
408 While it has not been as much of a concern for legal theorists, humanities theorists have
referred to and written about a "hierarchy of disabilities." See, e.g., Christopher Krentz, A
"Vacant Receptacle"? Blind Tom, Cognitive Difference, and Pedagogy, 120 PMLA 552, 555 (2005)
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with other sympathy-evoking disabilities who are "not to blame" for their
diseases (whatever their sources), or from people who have no health
differences. 4°9 In the end, for both HIV-positive victims and defendants,
we have a system that punishes HIV by giving harsher sentences to HIV-
positive defendants and misunderstanding the value of the lives of both
victims and defendants with HIV.
CONCLUSION
These cases offer a small set of windows into how HIV operates in the
criminal justice system. As such, they are flawed in their ability to support a
broader basis for generalization, but their study is not a fatal enterprise. As
a whole, they show a system struggling with the role of HIV in sentencing
and also public health concerns, strained prison medical care, and disease
contagion vis-a-vis sentencing.41 ° In the complexities of the defendants
and the victims, the details of the cases themselves, and the potential
stigmatized reactions by judges and juries, we see that nothing is so neatly
reduced to a spreadsheet of variables and outcomes. 411 HIV is embedded
in the facts of the cases and the associated stigmatized social statuses of
defendants and victims. 4 I To the extent, however, that HIV operates as a
disability-socially and medically defined-its effect on the outcomes in
the cases is far from neutral.
If nothing else, these cases reveal a glimmer of the reality that the
outcomes of our criminal justice system cannot be explained by logical and
moral theories of punishment alone. The failure to be able to point clearly
to where the law is operating versus where perceptions of HIV and the
people who have it are in play calls for further study of HIV stigma in
the courts. This article's research agenda prompts follow-up by formally
tracking HIV and related stigma in the judgment and sentencing phases, as
well as training judges and juries on disability and HIV issues. 413 These lines
of inquiry must come with the acknowledgment that HIV is not a single
experience, immutable across times and places, as these cases themselves
(locating cognitive disabilities below blindness in a "hierarchy of disabilities").
409 McArthur, supra note 88, at 740 (drawing a parallel between the disability experience of
HIV and blindness or the loss of a limb).
41o Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law
in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 1z8 (1999) (suggesting that legal and public health
reform are intertwined in important ways; policies toward communicable diseases such as
HIV need to be considered along with approaches to the administration of justice).
411 Ange-Marie Hancock, When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition: Examining
Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm, 5 PERSPS. ON POLs. 63, 63-64 (2007) (suggesting that an
intersectional approach to research is both a normative and empirical approach).
412 See discussion supra Part III.
413 MacGillis, supra note 141, at 231-32 (1996) (advocating for greater education of the courts
about HIV as an infection and as the basis for downward departures in sentencing).
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demonstrate so aptly. It can serve as a proxy for other forms of disability.
Initiatives directed at addressing HIV as a public health problem must also
take into consideration its relationship with the criminal justice system. In
doing so, the focus should not only be on what services are provided to ill
inmates, but also what HIV means in the search for and commitment to just
punishments.414
414 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 6z U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1022 (i995).
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